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In large-scale domestic disasters, a temporal gap frequently develops between the 
exhaustion of state and local resources and the arrival of federal resources.  To date, 
strategies for reducing this so-called “gap of pain” have not been based upon scientific 
methodology. This thesis reviews four alternatives for ensuring continuous availability of 
critical commodities:  pre-positioning, pre-emptive federal action, time-phased 
deployment, and surge transportation.  For a given scenario, the optimum approach is 
likely to be some combination of these alternatives.  Stochastic modeling using 
optimization techniques holds great promise for producing efficient and effective 
strategic solutions.  This thesis evaluates one such model using two notional scenarios 
affecting the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area:  a Category 4 hurricane and a 
one-kiloton nuclear explosion near the city center.  The results reinforce the validity of 
using this method to generate viable strategic alternatives for consideration by senior 
decision-makers.  With additional development and testing, the model may be 
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Throughout human history, governments have been expected to provide for the 
safety and security of their citizenry.  Necessarily, this included responding to an array of 
disasters, both natural and man-made.  To a great degree, the success or failure of past 
relief efforts has turned on the speed and efficiency with which the government delivered 
critical commodities to affected individuals.  In the United States, the federal 
government’s logistics processes for responding to emergencies and disasters have been 
largely ad hoc.  That approach has been a failure, as dramatically illustrated by the 
Hurricane Katrina response.  As Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary 
Michael Chertoff admitted, “FEMA’s logistics systems [in Katrina] were not up to the 
task.”1  In its report on the Katrina response, the Senate Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs was more blunt:  “FEMA’s logistics system failed out 
of the box[.]”2   
The direct consequence of this failure was an increase in human suffering among 
the victims of the hurricane.  The inadequacy of the federal logistics system was 
manifested in a temporal gap that developed between the exhaustion of state and local 
resources and the excruciatingly slow development of an effective federal re-supply 
effort.  This resource gap has been colloquially referred to as the “gap of pain.”3 
This gap of pain is not inevitable.  This paper hypothesizes that the gap can be 
reduced or eliminated by the strategic application of mathematical optimization models 
like the ones which have proven extremely successful in commercial and military supply 
                                                 
1 “DHS Vows to Reform Disaster Response,” National Defense 90 (April 2006), 9.; Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared, 109th 
Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, 375. 
2 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation 
Still Unprepared, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 2006, S. Rep. 109-322, 598. 
3 The term “gap of pain” was borrowed from a PowerPoint briefing given by Army Brigadier General 
Anthony Cuculo on the lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina. Brig Gen Cuculo is the Commander of the 
Joint Center for Operational Analysis and Lessons Learned (JCOA), a subordinate organization of U.S. 
Joint Forces Command. Joint Center for Operational Analysis, National Response to Catastrophic Events: 
Applied Lessons for Consequence Management, PowerPoint briefing, Colorado Springs, Colorado: 9 




chain management.  One such model, the Pre-positioning Optimization Model (POM), is 
employed to validate the hypothesis and demonstrate the applicability of the concept. 
There is no questioning the importance of the logistics function to the overall 
relief effort.  From before the creation of the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), the Incident Command System (ICS) included Logistics as one of its five major 
functional areas.4  Lynn Fritz, an expert on humanitarian logistics and founder of the 
nonprofit Fritz Institute, has estimated that disaster relief is 80 percent logistics.5  Anisya 
Thomas, the Fritz Institute’s managing director, adds that logistics “can be the difference 
in people making it or not making it.”6  Yet, despite unequivocal evidence of the 
significance of supply chain management to effective disaster relief, there has been little 
research on the humanitarian relief supply process.7  Only a handful of humanitarian 
relief organizations have prioritized the creation of high-performing logistics and supply 
chain operations.8  Sadly, national governments, including the U.S. federal government, 
are even farther behind.  There are a number of reasons that might help explain the lack 
of progress.  At various times and to various degrees, legal, fiscal, organizational, 
political, and technological considerations have created impediments.  Regardless of the  
precise cause, the reality is that, in the words of the bilateral House Committee that 
investigated the Katrina response, the federal logistics system for supplying aid to 
disaster victims is “broken and needs to be fixed.”9    
                                                 
4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004). 
5 Joseph Bonney, “Life-and-Death Logistics,” The Journal of Commerce 6, no. 2 (January 10, 2005), 6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Benita M. Beamon, “Humanitarian Relief Chains: Issues and Challenges” (paper presented at the 
34th International Conference on Computers and Industrial Engineering, San Francisco, CA, November 14-
16, 2004). 
8 Anisya S. Thomas, “Humanitarian Logistics: Matching Recognition with Responsibility,” Asia 
Development Review, June 2005, 29, http://www.fritzinstitute.org/PDFs/InTheNews/2005/ADR_0605.pdf 
(accessed October 2006). 
9 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation 
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, A Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 109th Cong., 2nd sess. 




Incredibly, examples of federal logistics mismanagement in disaster responses 
extend back decades.  In a 1953 after-action report on U.S. military assistance in the 
aftermath of severe floods in the Netherlands, the U.S. Army Europe Headquarters 
historian noted some of the same problems with lack of pre-planning and inadequate 
supplies that plagued Hurricane Katrina responders over 50 years later.10  In 1989 
Hurricane Hugo smashed into Charleston, South Carolina, leaving thousands homeless in 
a disaster zone spanning hundreds of square miles.  After it passed, it took the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) ten days to open the first disaster claim 
processing center in the city, prompting then-U.S. Senator Ernest “Fritz” Hollings to call 
the agency “the sorriest bunch of bureaucratic jackasses I’ve ever worked with.”11  In 
1993 Hurricane Andrew destroyed vast swaths of southern Florida.  A subsequent 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report faulted FEMA for its slow delivery of 
vital services for the hurricane’s victims.12  In post-disaster Senate subcommittee 
hearings, then-U.S. Senator Bob Graham of Florida opined that “FEMA did poorly,” 
because it “was asked to do a job which was beyond its capability.”  Sen. Graham 
introduced legislation that would have granted the President authority to direct the U.S. 
military to take the lead in “megadisasters.”13  Again in 1999, a major hurricane moved 
up the U.S. east coast.  This time, Hurricane Floyd dumped up to 20 inches of rain over 
eastern North Carolina, leaving victims clinging to trees and waiting on their roofs for 
rescue as floodwaters rose at a rate of a foot an hour.  Along with two other teams, 
members from Pennsylvania Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Task Force One 
(PA-TF1) were pre-deployed to the area in advance of the storm.  In a moving report of 
their experiences, the team’s frustration at the lack of rescue boats and equipment is 
palpable.  Team member Tim Sevison exclaims, “We can’t get FEMA to understand that 
                                                 
10 Headquarters U.S. Army Europe, Historical Division, U.S. Military Flood Relief Operations in the 
Netherlands (Karlsruhe, Germany: U.S. Army,1953). 
11 Bruce Smith, “Katrina Complaints Echo those of Hugo Response,” Mobile Register, sec. B, 
September 7, 2005. 
12 House Report on Katrina, 136. 
13 Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, Lessons Learned from Hurricane Andrew: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Toxic Substances, 
Research and Development of the Committee on Environment and Public Works, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 




it would be a good idea to add swiftwater/flood rescue components to all of the US&R 
Task Forces.”  Lt. Douglas Bair, a PA-TF1 rescue squad officer, said poignantly, “I wish 
I could grab some politicians and shake them into allowing this to happen before another 
100 people die because nobody is available to rescue them.”14 
The slowness and inadequacy of the federal response, expressed in the frustrations 
of responders, state and local officials, and victims, are common threads throughout all of 
these disasters.  Six years after Hurricane Floyd, these same themes repeated themselves 
in the response to Hurricane Katrina.  In its findings, the House Report on Katrina 
blandly noted that “[a]n overwhelmed logistics system made it challenging to get 
supplies, equipment, and personnel where and when needed.”15  Those who lived through 
the catastrophe were much less circumspect.  The mayor of East Baton Rouge Parish 
described the logistics response as “management by crisis.”16  It took almost four days 
after Katrina made landfall before basic necessities began to arrive for the survivors.17  
When they did, there was not enough.  The Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 
(MEMA) reported receiving less than 15 percent of its requested quantities of water, ice, 
and Meals Ready to Eat (MREs).  As a consequence, MEMA was forced to ask for help 
from other states, and to purchase the remainder of the needed supplies on the 
commercial market.  When the Alabama Emergency Management Agency requested 100 
trucks of water and 100 trucks of ice, FEMA sent 17 trucks of water and 16 trucks of 
ice.18   In Congressional hearings afterward, former FEMA director Mike Brown 
acknowledged that “FEMA has a logistics problem.”  He blamed the lack of a supply 
tracking system, stating if “[y]ou don’t have a unified command, [you] kind of go into an 
ad hoc mode.”19   
                                                 
14 Nancy J. Rigg, “Pennsylvania to the Rescue: PA-TF1 on Scene during Hurricane Floyd,” CFS 
Press, Asheville, NC, http://www.cfspress.com/riggfloyd.htm (accessed 21 February 2006). 
15 House Report on Katrina, 5. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Bud La Londe, “Fiddling while Rome Burns?” Supply Chain Management Review 9, no. 7 (October 
2005), 6. 





Mr. Brown and FEMA should not have been surprised that the logistics system 
performed so poorly.  In a March 2005 report, a government consultant concluded that 
FEMA needed an improved logistics capability and asset visibility.20  FEMA’s own 
post-Katrina report warned:  “For years FEMA has approached disasters almost timidly.  
FEMA should be attacking with sledgehammers, not fly swatters.  Specific changes in 
logistics need immediate attention.”21  The Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) in 
Louisiana told investigators from the Senate committee examining the federal 
government’s Katrina response that FEMA’s failure to track supplies “has been a 
problem at every disaster I’m aware of.”22 
The inescapable conclusion is that the federal government’s humanitarian 
logistics system is dysfunctional, and has been for some time.  As current FEMA Director 
R. David Paulison said in comparing the post-Hurricane Andrew recommendations with 
those made after Katrina, over a decade later, “You could have taken ‘Andrew’ out and 
put ‘Katrina’ in.”23  According to University of Pennsylvania political science professor 
Donald Kettl, some of the delay in implementing change may be attributed to fiscal 
constraints and bureaucratic inertia.  Says Kettl:   
The big crises like Sept. 11 and Katrina challenge us and punish us for 
failing to adapt.  But these [post-Katrina] reports call for really dramatic, 
radical changes in ways that disrupt the patterns of political power and 
standard operating procedure.  So it’s a lot easier to let the day-to-day 




                                                 
20 Lara Jakes Jordan, “Latest Review of FEMA Echoes Pre-Katrina Advice,” Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Nation/World, April 4, 2006, http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/national/265347_katrina05.html 
(accessed 22 February 2007). 
21 Ibid. 
22 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still 
Unprepared, 375. 





This institutional heel-dragging exacts a human toll.  From one disaster to the next, each 
failure of the federal humanitarian logistics system translates into increased human 
suffering.  As the Senate investigative committee concluded, “Ordinary people forced to 
endure inhuman circumstances were the victims of these failures.”25 
A. DEFINING THE ISSUE 
After nearly every major domestic disaster, questions are raised about the efficacy 
of the incremental process by which federal aid is brought to bear.  The traditional 
paradigm of waiting until local and state resources are overwhelmed has long roots, 
dating back at least as far as the Federal Response Plan (FRP).  In testimony to a Senate 
subcommittee after Hurricane Andrew, a FEMA official opined that “the guiding 
principle of disaster relief has always been that Federal assistance is provided only when 
response is beyond State and local capabilities and the State and local governments 
identify their needs for Federal aid.”26  The National Response Plan (NRP), the successor 
to the FRP, includes the requirement for State and local resource exhaustion as one of its 
core concepts.27  The viability of this approach is seriously tested by a large-scale 
disaster.  As Douglas Bair, a member of the Pennsylvania US&R team that responded to 
Hurricane Floyd, summarized it: 
By the time a community is overwhelmed and calls the county for help, 
the county’s overwhelmed and calls the state, and the state’s overwhelmed 
and calls the feds, people who might have been rescued if more resources 
has [sic] been available immediately are already dead.28 
Others said as much after Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina.  After Andrew, Sen. Bob 
Graham observed: 
 
                                                 
25 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still 
Unprepared, 375. 
26 Committee on Environment and Public Works, Lessons Learned from Hurricane Andrew, 127-28. 
27 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/committees/editorial_0566.shtm 
(accessed 20 March 2006). 




For most natural disasters, this procedure [of waiting for State and local 
resources to be exhausted] makes sense because it maximizes local control 
of the response effort.  But this system assumes that local and State 
governments will have the ability after the disaster strikes to assess their 
needs and the extent to which they are capable of responding to those 
needs.  It also assumes that the victims will have their basic needs of 
shelter, food, medicine, and safety provided for.29 
Those assumptions proved ill-founded in both Andrew and Katrina.  In both cases, State 
and local resources were quickly exhausted.  Days passed before significant amounts of 
federal relief supplies began to arrive.  The result was the growth of the so-called “gap of 
pain.”  Figure 1 provides a simple visual representation of the concept: 
 
 
Figure 1. Simple Depiction of the Gap of Pain 
 
The empirical evidence from Hurricanes Floyd, Andrew and Katrina and other 
major domestic disasters suggests that the gap appears frequently in such situations.  The 
practical consequence of the gap’s emergence is a delay in providing needed goods and 
                                                 
29 Committee on Environment and Public Works, Lessons Learned from Hurricane Andrew, 3. 
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services to survivors, and a commensurate increase in human suffering.  The seminal 
issue is how to close the gap; that is, how to ensure sufficient federal manpower and 
resources will be available when needed to compensate for the depletion of state and 
local resources, and will continue to be available through the remainder of the incident 
response period.  The focus of this thesis is an investigation of this question. 
Some of the factors influencing the size of the “gap of pain” are outside the 
control of policymakers, but many are not.  Reducing the gap through the application of 
thoughtful policy changes will mitigate the adverse consequences of an incident for its 
victims.  The missing setpiece in the “story” of disaster response is a coordinated, 
overarching logistics strategy.  In effect, this was also one of the “lessons learned” stated 
in the report commissioned by the President on the Katrina response.30  Among other 
things, the White House Report on Katrina recommends that DHS coordinate[s] with 
State and local governments and the private sector to develop a “modern, flexible, and 
transparent” logistics system.  The objective, according to the report, is to “develop the 
capacity to conduct large-scale logistical operations that supplement and, if necessary, 
replace State and local logistical systems by leveraging resources within both the public 
sector and the private sector.”31   
The federal government would benefit from examining the private sector for 
innovations.  For several years, the private sector has developed and applied 
technologically-based logistics management principles to improve the efficiency of 
commercial supply chains.  This new supply chain technology has transformed the 
logistics function from a peripheral to a strategic one.32  Using a combination of 
modeling techniques and best practices gleaned from experience, corporations have 
increased their productivity and improved customer satisfaction.  The contrary experience 
of relief organizations is instructive for the federal sector.  Until recently the logistics 
                                                 
30 Frances Fragos Townsend et al., The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006), 56 (alternately the “White House Report on Katrina”). 
31 Ibid. 
32 Anisya S. Thomas and Laura Rock Kopczak, From Logistics to Supply Chain Management: The 
Path Forward in the Humanitarian Sector (San Francisco, CA: Fritz Institute, 2005), 




practices of these nonprofits were “stuck somewhere in the 1970s or ‘80s.”33  Now, with 
the help of commercial logistics experts, some of these best practices have begun to make 
their way into relief organization logistics planning and execution.  Technology has 
played a significant role in the effort.  Indeed, Anisya Thomas, managing director of the 
Fritz Institute, a humanitarian logistics nonprofit, lists “developing flexible technology 
solutions” as one of five recommended strategies for improving humanitarian logistics.34  
Fritz Institute namesake Lynn Fritz identifies technology as one of the three critical 
components (along with people and expertise) of an effective logistics system.  However, 
that technology had been all but nonexistent in relief organizations.35  As these 
organizations have become more technologically savvy, their supply chain functionality 
and visibility has improved commensurately.  The next step is to bring technology to bear 
to improve the federal disaster relief logistics process.  The change cannot come soon 
enough for disaster victims ill served by extant, ad hoc logistics processes practiced by 
U.S. governmental entities at all levels. 
This thesis examines one means of leveraging technology to improve federal 
humanitarian logistics.  Using algorithms from the field of operations research, Capt Ee 
Shen Tean, a graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School, has created a strategic 
decision support model for humanitarian logistics systems.  His Pre-positioning 
Optimization Model (POM) seeks to discover the optimal arrangement of relief supplies 
and workers in advance of a major incident.36  The outputs of the model provide 
invaluable insight into the interrelationships between commodities, transportation 
methods, staging areas, and distribution points.  Using this information, planners and 
decision-makers can test a variety of conditions and scenarios to observe trends, 
anticipate needs, and identify gaps.   
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Inevitably, any solution based on mathematical models will be somewhat 
artificial.  Such models cannot hope to account for the universe of legal, political, and 
organizational considerations and constraints, let alone the vicissitudes inherent in the life 
cycle of a disaster.  Optimization models function within boundaries set by programmers 
and end users.  By contrast, the process of providing necessary goods and services to 
disaster victims takes place in an extraordinarily dynamic and unpredictable environment.  
One commentator has compared the challenge to “launching D-Day on 24 hours’ 
notice.”37  The products of a mathematical model always must be assessed for feasibility 
in light of other relevant factors.  For example, the model may conclude that the optimum 
federal response effort should begin at a time before state and local resources are 
exhausted.  Implementing that approach would require federal statutory authority, most 
likely an amendment to the Stafford Act.38  Likewise, the optimum theoretical model 
may have to yield, in whole or in part, to political or fiscal considerations.  These 
elements are outside the scope of this thesis.  Similarly, the state and local response is not 
studied, since it is assumed that Stafford Act conditions precedent have been satisfied; 
that is, that state and local capabilities have been overwhelmed before the states requested 
federal assistance.    
If the “modern, flexible, and transparent” logistics system advocated by the House 
committee that investigated the Katrina response were to be implemented, it may be 
expected that the gap of pain would be reduced.  A mathematically-based, stochastic 
(probabilistic) model of the sort examined in this thesis can be an integral part of that 
ideal system.  Granting the importance of unity of effort to the federal government’s 
overall disaster response, there are few, if any, major federal agencies that would not 
benefit from use of the model as a strategic planning tool.   
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B. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
The remainder of this paper will discuss the current logistics practices in the 
federal sector, compare four alternative techniques for response, and apply the POM to 
two hypothetical test cases to assess the viability of the model as a strategic decision-
making tool.   
Chapter II examines current logistics practices and strategies in the U.S. federal 
government’s planning and execution of disaster response missions.  Roles and 
responsibilities are delineated, and general strategies articulated.  Examples are given to 
illustrate the operation of the system as a whole. 
Chapter III enumerates four basic alternatives for rushing commodities and relief 
workers to the site of a disaster, and evacuating survivors from the area.  All four – 
pre-positioning, proactive deployment, surge transportation, and phased deployment – 
have been utilized to one extent or another in past disasters.  Likewise, all four have both 
advantages and disadvantages.  The alternatives are not exclusive.  For any given disaster 
scenario, it is likely that the optimum logistics process will be some combination of two 
or more alternatives.  The chapter discusses each alternative in turn, then concludes by 
proposing criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of any particular solution. 
Chapter IV introduces the POM as a useful method for evaluating literally tens of 
thousands of combinations of commodities, relief workers, staging locations, arrival 
(distribution) sites, and transportation means to arrive at an optimal system.  The model’s 
methodology is described, and its assumptions and limitations explained.  The utility of 
the model as a strategic planning tool is tested by applying it to two notional test cases:  a 
one-kiloton (1 kT) explosion of a nuclear device (weapon of mass destruction, or WMD) 
at Union Station in downtown Washington, D.C.; and a direct strike by a Category 4 
hurricane on the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.  For each case, two scenarios are 
tested, to simulate disasters of lesser and greater magnitude and scope, and to 
demonstrate the breadth of the model’s applicability. 
Chapter V reports the findings of the data runs.  The POM is used stochastically, 
and applied against several iterations of budget as an independent variable to produce 




trends and patterns is demonstrated.  For the two discrete cases chosen, the results show 
that Washington, D.C. is well positioned to respond to relatively small- or medium-sized 
incidents with little need for an all-out, combined governmental and private sector mass 
response.  Conversely, as the scale of the disaster is increased, or encumbrances such as 
closed roads are introduced, a critical need develops for a combined public-private effort 
that incorporates commercial cargo capacity.  Regarding expenditures, the data reveal a 
pronounced decline in incremental value gained (at least in terms of survivors saved) as 
budget amounts increase beyond a determinable level.  This finding has significant 
implications for policy makers trying to achieve the best use of limited financial 
resources.  Notwithstanding the particular findings made from the data used, the more 
general (and arguably more important) finding is that the POM is a robust tool capable of 
producing fundamental insights into trends and relationships, over a theoretically 
unlimited range of possible scenarios. 
Chapter VI concludes the thesis by emphasizing the utility of tools such as the 
POM for future planning and policymaking.  The POM is a positive first step, but more 





II. CURRENT PRACTICES AND STRATEGIES 
As was the case before Katrina hit, the federal response paradigm today is still 
relatively ad hoc.39  The processes for supplying critical commodities and humanitarian 
assistance to domestic disaster sites are a jumble of complicated and sometimes 
contradictory forms, procedures, and unstated conventions operating within stovepiped, 
inefficient federal bureaucracies.  As conceded by the White House Report on Katrina: 
The existing planning and operational structure for delivering critical 
resources and humanitarian aid clearly proved to be inadequate to the task.  
The highly bureaucratic supply processes of the Federal government were 
not sufficiently flexible and efficient, and failed to leverage the private 
sector and 21st Century advances in supply chain management.40 
Strategies for reducing the gap of pain inevitably must address deficiencies in the 
existing planning and operational structure.  Technologies such as the POM can play an 
important role.  By providing more, and better, predictive data to policymakers, the POM 
can help drive new strategies to improve the federal government’s logistics response to 
major incidents.  Before any new strategy is undertaken, it is instructive to first review 
the government’s current supply chain management processes and strategies.   
A. CURRENT FEDERAL LOGISTICS PROCESS 
The system in operation during Hurricane Katrina, and largely intact today, relies 
on a tiered approach.  As outlined in the NRP’s Logistics Management Support Annex, 
local jurisdictions must first attempt to fill requirements from their existing resources.  
Failing that, the local jurisdictions pass on the unfilled requirements to their respective 
county or State jurisdiction.  In turn, the State attempts to fill the requirement.  It can do 
so using its own resources, the resources of other states through Emergency Management 
Assistance Compacts (EMACs) or mutual aid agreements, or by contracting with  
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commercial sources.  If the State cannot meet the need, it requests federal assistance from 
the federal Joint Field Office (JFO) Operations Section.41  The JFO is the point of entry 
of a request into the federal process.   
Once the JFO Operations Section has received the State’s request for assistance, it 
attempts to satisfy the request from resources available in staging areas.  If that is not 
possible, the requirement is passed to the JFO Logistics Section through Emergency 
Support Function (ESF) #5 – Emergency Management.  Thereafter, the Logistics Section 
Chief looks to fill the request from one of three sources:  (i) resources at the logistics 
base; (ii) another Federal agency via a formal mission assignment; or (iii) a commercial 
source, using a requisition form submitted to the JFO Finance/Administration Section.  If 
none of these avenues is successful, the Logistics Section Chief passes the requirement 
through the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) to the National Response 
Coordination Center (NRCC).  Once there, the request is evaluated by the NRCC to 
determine how and if it can be met.42  If the NRCC identifies a source for the requested 
resources, it arranges for the resources to be delivered to the location specified by the 
Logistics Division Chief.43 
The NRP anticipates that each NIMS-based organizational element (JFOs, 
mobilization centers, RRCCs, and the NRCC) will have a separate logistics section.  In 
addition, several other federal agencies have logistics-related roles under the NRP.  For 
example, the General Services Administration (GSA) is the coordinating agency for ESF 
#7 – Resource Support.  In that capacity, the GSA acts as the central procurement 
authority for the federal government.44  It acts on requests from the JFO, the NRCC, and 
other entities to purchase goods and services to meet requirements.  Separately 
DHS/EPR/FEMA, as the coordinating agency for ESF #5, is responsible for directing the 
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disposition of all property owned by a federal agency that is used in the disaster relief 
effort.45  Other federal agencies with roles and responsibilities include the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), as the coordinator of, and contractor for, all transportation 
requirements under ESF #1 – Transportation; the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(USACE), responsible for ESF #3 – Public Works and Engineering; and the Department 
of Health and Human Services, the coordinating agency for ESF #8 – Public Health and 
Medical Services.46 
Apart from the many disparate federal agencies with roles in the logistics process, 
there is a dizzying array of smaller entities with important functions.  Within 
DHS/EPR/FEMA, a separate Mobilization Center is the nominal focal point for 
pre-positioning, receipt and distribution of supplies.  Within DOT a Movement 
Coordination Center (MCC) manages transportation of response resources to individual 
mobilization centers and follow-on distribution points.47  DHS/EPR/FEMA Headquarters 
controls movement of these items, through the DHS/EPR/FEMA region with jurisdiction 
over the disaster site, and in coordination with the DHS/EPR/FEMA Logistics section.  
DHS/EPR/FEMA Headquarters does not actually determine the best method and source 
of transportation, however.  That responsibility falls to an Emergency Transportation 
Center (ETC), a sub-unit of ESF #1 within the JFO.48 
As tangled and convoluted as this process appears, it is only the front end of an 
even more arcane system.  Within federal agencies, other layers of bureaucracy may 
further slow the delivery of critical commodities to disaster victims.  Most notably, the 
Department of Defense (DOD) has its own requirements for providing logistical support.  
Unquestionably, the agency which the White House averred “has the capability to play a 
critical role in the Nation’s response to catastrophic events” is unique in the size and 
scope of its logistics capabilities.49  Yet, even as it holds the tools and the expertise to 
                                                 
45 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, LOG-2. 
46 Ibid., LOG-4. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., LOG-3. 




deliver supplies and services rapidly, and in unparalleled amounts, DOD is restricted by 
law and policy from taking a leadership role in domestic disaster response.  Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 5 speaks of providing military support “as directed by the 
President or when consistent with military readiness and appropriate under the 
circumstances and the law.”  The NRP and the DOD joint publication on homeland 
security speak more restrictively of providing support only when local, state and other 
federal resources are overwhelmed.50  In interpreting its role as a supporting agency to 
another lead federal agency, DOD has created a system that rivals that of the NRP for 
layers of bureaucracy.  Figure 2 below depicts the typical mission assignment process for 
a request for assistance from civil authorities.  There is no provision for a shorter process 
in emergencies.  In fact, the figure below assumes that a major disaster has already 
occurred, a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is in place at the JFO, and a military 
Joint Task Force (JTF) has been created to command and control the DOD portion of the 
response effort. 
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1. Regional or state agency requests 
assistance from LFA.
2. LFA submits formal RFA to FCO.
3. FCO reviews RFA for tasking & funding.
4. FCO sends RFA to DCO/JTF.  If validated by 
JTF Commander,  RFA becomes MA, is sent to 
NORTHCOM.
5. NORTHCOM reviews MA, sends to JDOMS 
for processing.
6. JDOMS sends MA to ASD(HD) for review; 
ASD(HD) forwards to SECDEF with 
recommendations; SECDEF takes action.
7. If MA approved, JDOMS issues EXORD  to 
NORTHCOM, other combatant commands & 
Services as applicable.
8. NORTHCOM coordinates with JTF to ensure 
required resources are provided.




















LFA – Lead Federal Agency DCO – Defense Coordinating Officer JDOMS – Joint Director of Military Support
RFA – Request for Assistance JTF – Joint Task Force ASD(HD) – Ass’t Secretary of Defense for
EXORD – Execution Order SECDEF – Secretary of Defense Homeland Defense




Figure 2. The DOD Mission Assignment Process 
 
The entire discussion supra on processing a request for assistance through local, 
county, State and finally federal officials is subsumed in steps 1 through 3 of the flow 
diagram in Figure 2.  The remaining six steps are particular to DOD.  Other federal 
agencies have their own, unique procedures for processing these aid requests. 
If each step represents some increment of time between the local authority’s 
request and the delivery of resources, it is easy to understand why some civilian 
authorities in Louisiana and Mississippi chose to circumvent the normal procedures for 
requesting aid, in the interest of expediting deliveries.  The House Committee Report on 
Katrina documents the example of the Louisiana Adjutant General requesting federal 
military forces directly from the active duty commander, Gen Russel Honoré.  The report 
speculates that the Louisiana Adjutant General’s request may have reflected “frustration 
with the bureaucratic process.”51  Similarly, the White House Report on Katrina found 
                                                 




that even the federal resource managers found it very difficult to determine what 
resources were needed, what was available, and where the available resources were 
located at any given time.52  In short, State and local authorities encountered a 
complicated federal logistics system, and predictably responded with a confused 
patchwork of extra-procedural efforts.  Federal authorities, who assumed primary 
responsibility for the logistics effort when State and local authorities became 
overwhelmed, had “no clear picture of what was really needed; nor was there clear 
authority to allow unilateral Federal intervention.”  If these conclusions were germane 
only to Hurricane Katrina, they might be dismissed as the unfortunate, but atypical, 
results of a once-in-a-century storm.  However, they come from the statement of Dennis 
H. Kwiatkowski, a senior FEMA official, in formal testimony before a Senate 
subcommittee investigating the federal response to Hurricane Andrew in 1993.53  That so 
little changed in the intervening twelve years is compelling evidence of the endemic 
flaws in a system that has endured repeated appeals for its overhaul. 
B. FEDERAL POLICIES AND STRATEGIES 
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reserves to the States those 
powers that are not expressly delegated to the United States.  This amendment expresses 
the core organizing principle of a federalist democracy.  In the context of disaster 
response, it is expressed as the fundamental premise that incidents are best managed at 
the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level.54  This premise is 
sanctioned in core homeland security strategic documents.  For instance, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5 states: 
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The Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of State 
and local authorities in domestic incident management.  Initial 
responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally falls on State and 
local authorities.55 
The practical consequence of this policy is to compel a tiered approach with State 
and local authorities as the initial responders.  Though nowhere stated formally, the 
conventional expectation is that communities must be prepared to stand on their own for 
up to 72 hours after a disaster occurs, before they should expect significant federal 
assistance to arrive.56  Thereafter, as the scope of the disaster broadens, the response 
gradually escalates until in the most catastrophic events, federal authorities assume the 
logistics function completely.   
Curiously, this tiered approach is exactly what the White House Report on 
Katrina recommends as the solution for the logistics failures identified in the Katrina 
response.  Specifically, the White House report proposes a four-tiered system:  first, State 
and local resources, preferably pre-contracted; second, State mutual support through 
EMACs; third, federal assistance to move commodities regionally; and fourth, FEMA 
supplementation of, or complete substitution for, State and local logistics systems.  This 
proposal differs little from the current system, except for the report’s reference to a “fully 
modern approach to commodity management.”57 
The White House plan amounts to a “pull” system of logistics support.  In a pull 
system, State and local authorities are presumed to know their needs, and to be able to 
timely articulate them to federal authorities.  This system may work well in smaller cases, 
where States and local authorities are not quickly overwhelmed, or otherwise require only 
limited federal assistance.  It is an abject failure in catastrophic incidents, where State and 
local resources are almost immediately exhausted, or the State and local governments are  
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themselves debilitated or ineffectual.  Like most current federal initiatives to improve 
disaster relief supply chain management, the White House plan is reactive in nature.  At 
its core, it does not address the problem of a fragmented and uncoordinated system.58 
In contrast to the White House’s reliance on a pull system, the House Committee 
Report on Katrina urges development of a “push” system of logistics support.  In a push 
system, federal assets are moved into a threatened area ahead of a disaster, without 
waiting for a specific State or local request.59  Among other benefits, a push system 
forecloses situations such as happened in Katrina, where local authorities were too 
overwhelmed, and their communications abilities too degraded, for a pull system to 
work.60  FEMA used a push system successfully, though on an ad hoc basis, in its 
response to Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii in September 1992.61  The NRP Catastrophic 
Incident Annex (NRP-CIA) includes authority for implementing a federal push logistics 
system when the DHS Secretary has declared an Incident of National Significance and 
ordered implementation of the NRP-CIA.62  The Planning Assumptions contained in the 
NRP-CIA list indicia of a catastrophic incident.  These include: 
• The incident may cause large numbers of casualties and/or displaced 
persons. 
• The nature and scope of the incident will immediately overwhelm State 
and local response capabilities and require immediate Federal support. 
• To save lives, prevent human suffering, and mitigate severe damage, the 
federal response must commence immediately, before receipt of a request 
via normal NRP channels. 
• The incident may cause significant disruption of the area’s critical 
infrastructure, including energy, transportation, telecommunications, and 
public health and medical resources.63 
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Notwithstanding the authority granted in the plan, the DHS Secretary has never 
invoked the Catastrophic Incident Annex.64  Thus, while the legal structure and authority 
exists to implement push logistics, to date it has not been exercised or implemented. 
Arguably one of the most significant differences between a pull system and a 
push system is in the source and quality of information.  The pull system relies on timely 
and accurate inputs from State and local authorities on the amount and type of aid 
needed.  By contrast, a push system assumes that federal logisticians have forecast the aid 
requirements in advance.  While it might be possible to simply deliver or pre-position 
large quantities of common commodities to a disaster area ahead of a storm, this 
approach is both costly and inefficient.  Moreover, it is infeasible for situations where 
there is little or no advance warning, such as a terrorist attack or earthquake. 
It is at this point in the process that a stochastic model such as the POM can be 
leveraged to great advantage.  Armed with the supply chain data generated by the model, 
decision makers will have new ways to create efficiencies.  In addition, federal logistics 
planners will be able to identify persistent shortfalls in, for instance, ramp space, 
warehouse capacity, or transportation cargo capacity.  With this trend information, senior 
decision makers can take steps to mitigate the shortfalls, whether through the budget 
process, or through considered shifts in policy or strategy. 
To implement national level policies and strategy at the operational level, logistics 
planners can choose from one or more of four basic options:  pre-positioning supplies, 
deploying assets in advance, “surging” using all available transportation means after the 
disaster has occurred, or deploying assets in pre-established phases.  Each of these 








                                                 





























In the aftermath of a large-scale disaster, the delivery of supplies and personnel 
into an affected region is a major undertaking.  After Hurricane Katrina swept through 
the Gulf Coast, the demand for commodities quickly exhausted State and local resources 
throughout affected areas in Louisiana and Mississippi.  Thereafter, federal agencies 
ranging from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to the U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs mobilized personnel and resources in support of the logistics effort.  U.S. 
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement trucks delivered clothing to evacuees.  
Department of Agriculture teams with expertise in setting up logistics staging areas, 
distributing food and removing debris assisted FEMA workers.65  One agency alone, the 
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), secured more than 1,600 trucks to deliver 
more than 25 million Meals Ready to Eat (MREs), 31 million liters of water, 56,400 
tarps, 19 million pounds of ice, and 215,000 blankets.66 
However impressive the final totals, the transition from State to federal logistics 
responsibility was far from smooth.  While the vast resources of the federal government 
surged to eventually meet survivor demands, the process was slow.  As a result, survivors 
endured extended periods without food, water, shelter or other necessities.  Some died, 
while many others suffered needlessly.  Alternatives existed to improve the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the total response effort.  Commodities could have been 
pre-positioned in advance of the storm.  Federal assets could have been deployed sooner, 
even before the hurricane made landfall.  A coordinated, phased deployment of assets 
leading up to and following the storm’s passage could have been executed.   
These four techniques – pre-positioning, proactive deployment, surging, and 
phased deployment – form the basic toolkit for operations planners.  Every humanitarian 
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relief effort uses one or more of these techniques to accomplish the mission.  The degree 
of success of the relief effort will depend on how effectively these four are balanced.    
A. EVALUATING THE ALTERNATIVES 
1. Pre-positioning 
Pre-positioning can be defined as the permanent storage of equipment and 
supplies near a potential disaster site well in advance of a potential need.  The federal 
government frequently pre-positions necessities such as water and MREs in high-risk 
areas to shorten response times and facilitate delivery of time critical supplies to 
distribution points.  Pre-positioning is not the same as a push system.  Pre-positioned 
assets still need to be mobilized and deployed to the field.  That can happen proactively if 
the assets are pushed to State or local jurisdictions, or reactively if they are delivered only 
after a State request.67 
The Katrina response represented the largest pre-positioning of federal assets in 
history.  FEMA pre-positioned truckloads of water, ice and food at staging locations 
throughout the southeastern U.S.  Figure 3 shows the status of pre-positioned FEMA 
supplies as of August 29, 2005, when Hurricane Katrina came ashore near New Orleans.  
Many of the pre-positioned supplies were stored at Camp Beauregard, a federal 
staging area in Pineville, LA, well inland from the Gulf Coast.  These supplies included 
30 truckloads of water, 17 truckloads of ice, 15 trailer loads of MREs, and six trailer 
loads of tarps.  These supplies had been positioned months before in anticipation of the 
2005 hurricane season.  As Katrina passed over Florida and made its way over the Gulf 
of Mexico enroute to Louisiana, FEMA did not bring in any additional commodities to 
Camp Beauregard.68  The same pattern was repeated in Mississippi and Alabama.  For 
example, FEMA ordered 400 trucks of ice, 400 trucks of water, and 250 trucks of MREs 
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for delivery to the Naval Air Station in Meridian, Mississippi.  At landfall only 30 trucks 
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n  San Antonio, TX – 1.8M lbs. ice 
o  Fort Worth, TX – 320K lbs. ice, 919K 
 MREs 
p  Barksdale AFB, LA – 40K lbs. ice 
q  Alexandria, LA – 680K lbs. ice 
r  Camp Beauregard, LA – 702K liters water,
 880K lbs. ice, 306K MREs 
s  Superdome – 90K liters water 
t  Meridian, MS – 720K liters water, 
 840K lbs. ice 
u  Selma, AL – 2.16M lbs. ice 
v Maxwell AFB, AL – 954K liters water, 
640K lbs. ice, 657K MREs 
w Montgomery, AL – 1M lbs. ice 
 Saufley Field, FL – 360K liters water 
 Palmetto, GA – 1M MREs 
 Atlanta, GA – 110K MREs 
 Thomasville, GA – 9.2M lbs. ice 
 McEntire ANGS, SC – 540K liters  
 water, 131K MREs 
 Homestead, FL – 522K liters water,  










After Katrina struck, the pre-positioned supplies quickly ran out.  This illustrates 
one of the weaknesses of reliance primarily on pre-positioned supplies:  requirements 
estimates must be quite accurate, or critical shortfalls quickly develop.  Once that 
happens, it is difficult for the logistics system to catch up in the short term. 
The pre-positioning method suffers from other weaknesses as well.  Leasing or 
buying warehouse space can be expensive.  Perishable supplies cannot be stored for long 
periods.  Some items, such as medicines, must be stored in controlled conditions.  
Choosing storage locations can be problematic:  Too close to the affected area, and there 
is significant risk that the supplies will be caught up in the disaster and degraded or lost.  
Too far away, and supplies cannot be transported to the disaster zone quickly enough.  
Without an asset tracking system, pre-positioned supplies can be diverted or lost.  This 
happened in Katrina, where pre-positioned federal assets destined for local hospitals were 
never received.71 
There are advantages to pre-positioning equipment and supplies.  Certain 
commodities, such as water, MREs, and medical supplies will be required in nearly all 
disaster scenarios.  At least some of these “stock” supplies can be stored virtually 
indefinitely.  Bottled water, tarps and cots are all examples.  Although needs estimates 
may be inaccurate, extra supplies may be stored as a buffer against unforeseen 
circumstances (though this will increase storage costs).  Finally, pre-positioning supplies 
effectively shortens the supply chain, leaving less chance for delivery delays. 
The federal government has recently placed additional emphasis on 
pre-positioning in its planning and preparation for future major hurricanes.  In advance of 
the 2006 hurricane season, FEMA dramatically increased its stockpiles of relief supplies.  
According to the official web site of the Office of the [U.S.] President, DHS stockpiled 
four times the MREs and ice and 2.5 times the water as what it had available prior to 
Hurricane Katrina.  The web site claims that the pre-positioned supplies have the capacity 
to sustain one million people for a week.72  Of course, having adequate stocks of supplies 
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in warehouses close to the disaster area is only part of the process.  There must be quick 
and efficient means to transport the supplies from the staging areas to points of 
distribution within the disaster zone. 
2. Proactive Deployment 
Proactive deployment is synonymous with push logistics.  The concept is 
analogous to pre-positioning, but on a different timetable.  Pre-positioning is done 
without consideration of a specific threat, while proactive deployment is done in response 
to a pre-existing threat or event.  The supplies stored at Camp Beauregard in early 2005 
were pre-positioned months before Hurricane Katrina threatened the Gulf Coast.  In 
proactive deployment, additional supplies, equipment and personnel are transported to 
staging sites near the projected disaster area usually no more than a few days in advance. 
The great advantage of proactive deployment is that it takes place under 
conditions of good, albeit imperfect, information.  Whereas pre-positioning is done based 
on such factors as historical risk, proactive deployment is intended to prepare an area to 
respond to a known threat or condition.  Accordingly, the deployed “package” can be 
more closely tailored to anticipated needs.  If the threat is a flood, swift water rescue 
teams and equipment and sandbags will be a priority.  If the threat is a volcanic eruption, 
for instance Mount St. Helens, the pre-deployed package might include burn treatment 
medicines and specialized burn treatment medical teams.  In addition, the quantities of 
goods and relief services required can be estimated much more accurately, resulting in a 
more efficient distribution of commodities and relief workers.  Proactive deployment also 
has the advantage of minimal storage costs, relative to the pre-positioning option. 
On the negative side, deploying assets proactively in a matter of days still requires 
a significant commitment of the transportation means, as well as the workers and supplies 
themselves.  This is particularly true for specialists, such as trauma physicians.  
Pre-deploying this group in anticipation of a hurricane that never makes landfall wastes 
valuable resources and incurs substantial costs.  Likewise, push logistics is unavailing for 






if not accompanied by adequate pre-planning.   Misjudging the volume of commodities 
that will be needed to supply an affected region, and the expected duration of the relief 
effort, can result in a severe resource gap and increased human suffering. 
3. Surge Transportation 
Surge transportation assumes that no commodities or workers are pre-positioned 
prior to an incident.  After the fact, all available transportation methods are mobilized and 
employed to supply the affected area.  To a degree, surge methods were used in 
responding to Hurricane Katrina.  Assets from across the federal, State and local 
governments were brought to bear.  These included non-traditional transportation 
sources, such as U.S. Department of Agriculture trucks delivering food and baby formula, 
and National Guard helicopters airdropping MREs, water and ice into areas isolated by 
debris fields.73  About a dozen commercial airlines and contract carriers also assisted, but 
only after DHS Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson called Air Transport Association 
president Jim May asking for help.  There were no pre-existing contracts in place for air 
support.74 
Since proactive deployment cannot be used in situations where the disaster is 
sudden and unexpected, surge transportation may be required.  Terrorist attacks are an 
obvious example.  As the Katrina experience showed, this method is not as well suited 
for times where advance notice is available, notably hurricanes, floods, and other 
slow-developing disaster scenarios. 
Surge transportation is the most reactive of the four approaches.  It is analogous, 
but not identical, to a pure “pull” logistics system.  Pull logistics is defined by the 
requirement that customers (in disasters, State and local authorities) must request the 
goods or services to be provided.  Only when a request is received will the provider begin 
shipping.  In contrast, federal authorities may begin surge deliveries of supplies and relief 
workers to a disaster zone without a State or local request.  This can occur if it is apparent 
that State and local governments have broken down, or are overwhelmed.   
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At its most robust, surge transportation is characterized by strong public-private 
partnerships that give government responders ready access to commercial means of 
transportation.  There is precedent for these sorts of arrangements.  The Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet (CRAF) and the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA) are DOD 
programs which co-opt private sector assets on minimal notice to meet critical military 
mission requirements.  DHS has no functional equivalents.  However, it could adopt the 
CRAF and VISA programs as models to develop its own arrangements with commercial 
air cargo, freight, sealift, and rail transport companies.75   
The advantages of creating such programs are manifest.  By using private sector 
assets pursuant to pre-established agreements like the VISA, the federal government 
would be leveraging the latest advances in commercial supply chain management.  It also 
would be, in effect, substantially increasing the size of its transportation force 
immediately upon activation of the relevant agreement.  A less obvious advantage is in 
cost savings.  In the Katrina response, there was ample evidence of “on the fly” 
government purchasing and contracting at costs well above market rates.76  These 
excesses would be largely avoided if the federal government had pre-established rates 
and requirements with domestic carriers.  Two of the major after-action reports on 
Katrina – the White House report and the House Committee report – recommend that 
DHS enter into such pre-established contracts for the provision of goods and services 
during emergencies.77  The House Committee report expressly recommends 
consideration of a CRAF program to provide commercial air support to future relief 
efforts.78  To its credit, DHS appears to be making progress on this front.  In advance of 
the 2006 hurricane season, DHS Secretary Chertoff told a National Emergency  
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Management Association conference that the agency was ending the former practice of 
entering into ad hoc trucking contracts through DOT.  According to Secretary Chertoff, 
in the future such contracts will be pre-arranged.79 
4. Phased Deployment 
“Phased deployment” is the fourth basic method of supplying goods and services 
in a disaster response.  It is not a term of art; in fact, it is not an approach recognized by 
government planners.  Rather, the approach is the author’s adaptation of the Just-in-Time 
(JIT) production philosophy commonly found in commercial supply chain management  
The essential premise of JIT is that supply chains can become more efficient by 
scheduling the materials, supplies and even services needed for production so that they 
arrive just when they are needed.  Among other benefits, this saves warehousing costs by 
minimizing excess inventory.  The impact can be tremendous.  For example, in the early 
1980s Ford’s shift to a JIT system reduced its inventory holding costs by 33%, for a total 
savings of three billion dollars.80 
While Just-in-Time systems are perfectly suitable for some commercial supply 
chains, JIT suffers too many major flaws to make it broadly feasible for disaster relief.  In 
the context of emergency response, a disaster relief supply chain built solely on JIT 
principles stands a good chance of failing.  JIT systems do not cope well with change, in 
particular changing demand rates.  JIT tends to be a pull system which does not anticipate 
customer demand; in the words of one author, “JIT doesn’t plan well.”81  In addition, JIT 
relies on a steady inventory stream.  The flow can be disrupted by flooding, earthquakes, 
labor strikes, or any number of other impedances.82  Adequate human capital is a 
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prerequisite to the success of JIT systems.83  However, after a disaster strikes, workers’ 
personal concerns frequently outweigh their motivation to report to work.  This was very 
publicly demonstrated in media reporting of the New Orleans Police Department’s high 
rate of absenteeism after Hurricane Katrina struck. 
While a “pure” JIT supply chain would be inappropriate for disaster response, 
some of its features merit consideration by government planners.  JIT assumes that 
requirements can be predicted in advance.  Using optimization algorithms, corporations 
backtrack from a set of given requirements to determine the most efficient flow of 
pre-production components to the manufacturing facility.  To borrow a military term, this 
is a tactical solution.  If disaster relief requirements could be predicted with reasonable 
precision, it would seem to be possible to apply the same optimization methodology to 
arrive at an “ideal” stream of goods and services to a disaster site. 
Phased deployment, a modification of JIT, may have applicability for some types 
of incidents.  There are circumstances where the effects of, and therefore the response 
requirements for, a specific scenario can be modeled with some precision.  This paper 
uses one such scenario, a one-kiloton nuclear detonation in an urban area.  To the extent 
that information on requirements is available, and somewhat static, logistics planners 
could create plans which match commodity flows more precisely to victims’ needs at 
particular points in time in the recovery process.  Even if phased deployment cannot be 
used at the tactical level, it may have utility as a strategic tool.  Assuming a stochastic 
model, i.e. with random variables, it should be possible to derive strategic conclusions 
from the results of repeated data runs using a wide range of hypothetical scenarios. 
B. TOWARD AN OPTIMAL SOLUTION 
Depending on the scenario and the quality of information known in advance, any 
of the four alternatives may be the best approach.  In most cases, a combination of 
methods will yield the most efficient solution. 
                                                 




Figure 4 graphically illustrates the fundamentally different approaches used by the 
four methods to supply commodities and workers to an affected area.   
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of Disaster Relief Supply Alternatives 
 
The chart’s vertical axis represents the volume of supplies delivered.  For 
purposes of the notional chart, a maximum daily delivery capacity for the entire logistics 
system of 5000 cubic feet (ft3 x 1000) is assumed.  The horizontal axis represents the 
timeline of the disaster, backward one year and forward one month from the date of the 
incident (“D” day).  Note that the horizontal axis is not to scale; it has been compressed 
for clarity.  The colored bars represent volumes of commodities delivered on a given day 
using a specific method.  The skewed red curve on the “post-incident” side of the chart 
represents a typical pattern of commodities requirements following a disaster:  steep at 
first, peaking some days after the incident, then tapering off over a period of weeks. 
The overarching objective is to “fill in the bubble”; that is, to deliver relief 
supplies and workers at such as pace and in such quantities as to completely satisfy 




inefficiencies and excess costs – warehousing costs, supply chain backlogs, and the like.  
Gaps between bars under the curve and the curve itself represent needs unmet at that 
time.  Supplies may be available, for instance if they have been pre-positioned, but they 
were not delivered at the time they were needed. 
The chart offers a basis for comparison of the four supply alternatives.  The most 
obvious difference between the methods is temporal.  As the chart shows, pre-positioning 
takes place well before the incident occurs.  Proactive deployment starts when the threat 
is identified, usually only a few days before the threat actually materializes, and ends 
when the incident occurs.  Surge transportation starts immediately after the incident 
occurs, but takes a while to ramp up to maximum system capacity.  Phased deployment 
attempts to match the requirements curve, tailoring deliveries to identified needs.   
Another point of comparison is the relationship of the alternatives to the 
requirements curve.  Because they occur so far in advance, flows of supplies to be 
pre-positioned are not tied to the requirements curve.  Therefore, the only information the 
planner needs to know is the total amount of commodities needed, not their distribution.  
The same could be said of proactive deployment, though since it takes place immediately 
prior to the incident, there is less opportunity to make up shortfalls.  Accordingly, 
logisticians planning proactive deployments need to have some sense of the requirements 
distribution, so they can plan to cover any shortfalls as soon after the incident as possible.  
Surge transportation, the pull system analogue, correlates to the requirements curve only 
imperfectly.  By its nature, surge transportation will almost always be a step behind 
requirements.  As additional layers of bureaucracy are introduced, and State and local 
authorities’ ability to submit requests is diminished, the surge curve shifts to the right, 
becoming progressively distant from the requirements curve.  Phased deployment comes 
closest to matching the requirements curve.  Given a static post-disaster environment, 
phased deployment is clearly the preferred method.  But, neither Mother Nature nor 
terrorists are that cooperative.  Shifting winds, downed power lines, and damaged roads, 
bridges and other infrastructure wreak havoc with phased deployment plans. 
By itself, none of these alternatives is sufficient.  Simply put, humanitarian 




relief is the ultimate sense-and-respond supply chain.”84  In other words, disaster logistics 
will always occur in an environment of variable demand and uncertainty.  In the military 
context, this is often referred to as the “fog of war,” from von Clausewitz: 
The great uncertainty of all data in war is a peculiar difficulty, because all 
action must, to a certain extent, be planned in a mere twilight, which in 
addition not infrequently — like the effect of a fog or moonshine — gives 
to things exaggerated dimensions and unnatural appearance.85 
There is no absolute remedy for the inevitable uncertainty and complexity 
attendant with operating a disaster relief logistics system.  However, there are remedial 
measures that can, and should, be taken.  Foremost among these, at least for purposes of 
this thesis, is the development of flexible technology solutions.  Anisya Thomas of the 
Fritz Institute lists this among five strategies for humanitarian aid agencies to adopt to 
improve their operations.  Although her advice was intended for nongovernmental relief 
organizations, it is equally persuasive for the public sector.  According to Ms. Thomas, 
“Despite the complexity of humanitarian logistics, manual processes still dominate and 
IT resources that could enhance information availability, reporting and learning are often 
not effectively leveraged.”86 
The stochastic optimization model discussed in the remainder of this paper offers 
a practical, strategic level technology solution of the sort advocated by Ms. Thomas.  
Using real-world data, the POM can give logistics planners and senior policymakers 
visibility of the supply pipeline for a particular incident and location.  It is also a learning 
tool.  As it is applied to a variety of scenarios and under a range of conditions, it will 
provide insights into relationships, capabilities, and potential shortfalls.  Although not a 
panacea, the POM is a worthy first effort to model disaster relief supply chains in ways 
that are useful to operators and decision makers. 
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IV. THE STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
A. MODEL DESCRIPTION 
The Pre-positioning Optimization Model (POM)87 is a two-stage, linear, 
mixed-integer program that endeavors to calculate the placement and employment of 
relief units and assets to achieve the most efficient supply distribution network.  The 
program is written in open source code using the General Algebraic Modeling System 
(GAMS).88  Data sets are solved using ILOG’s CPLEX, a high-performance software 
program for solving large-scale mathematical optimization problems.89 
The model employs linear, mixed-integer programming.  Regarding the former, 
the POM assumes that the variables in the model are related to each other linearly.  
Linear programming is a mathematical technique dating back to World War II, when 
George Dantzig, a RAND Corporation mathematician, developed the Simplex Method to 
solve military logistics problems.  Its power comes from its ability to solve a wide array 
of complex problems quickly and efficiently.  A linear programming problem is 
characterized by a linear objective function of some discrete number of real variables 
subject to a number of linear constraints.90     
The “mixed-integer” part of the model description refers to the expression in 
whole numbers of some decision variables, for example, the number of aircraft and trips 
made.91  In mathematical terms, solving this optimization problem involves maximizing a 
linear function of many variables subject to linear constraints, where one or more 
variables must be integral.92  Here, the constraints include parameters such as total 
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budget, maximum number of units of transportation means (TMs) available, maximum 
space available on each TM, and maximum expansion capacity for ramps, warehouses 
and medical facilities.  The reader is referred to Captain Tean’s thesis for a more 
complete description of the constraints. 
The model is stochastic, two-stage93 in the sense that it explicitly incorporates 
uncertainty by examining the logistics network from two perspectives, strategic and 
operational.  POM outputs particular to the first (strategic) stage include 
recommendations to expand warehouses, health care facilities, and ramp space, as well as 
the recommended number of health care personnel to care for survivors.  These are all 
strategic decisions that will take years to implement.  The second (operational) stage 
takes a shorter, scenario-dependent view.  Here, the model represents the humanitarian 
logistics system as a functioning network, and examines its operation over the course of a 
72-hour period immediately following a major incident.  Second-stage parameters 
include the number of potential survivors (PS) and commodity demand at each affected 
area (AA),94 as well as the accessibility of each AA using each of the defined TMs.95   
The two views are related by the concept of “recourse,” defined as the ability to 
take corrective actions after an uncertain event has taken place.  In the strategic stage of 
the model, decisions are made about expanding warehouses, medical facilities, and ramp 
space.  The goal is to maximize the expected number of rescued survivors based on those 
decisions, across a range of random values for the second-stage variables.  In the 
operational stage, the model incorporates the decisions made in the first stage, and 
optimizes the commodity distribution process for each defined scenario in order to 
maximize rescued survivors for that scenario.  To encourage the model to prioritize 
commodity deliveries, the data includes a penalty of ten survivors per thousand cubic feet 
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of undelivered commodities.96  The random nature of the second-stage parameters 
renders the solution stochastic, hence the description of the mathematical process as a 
two-stage stochastic optimization problem.97  
The POM is flexible enough to accommodate transportation means in all three 
domains – air, land and sea.  Aircraft, helicopters, trucks, buses, and ships are all valid 
TMs in the POM.  Thus, the model can yield relevant insights for circumstances ranging 
from the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia, where commodities had to be airlifted or 
sealifted to island-based survivors, to the 2005 Pakistani earthquake, where sealift was 
not an option.  Likewise, since budget is accounted for as a constraint in the model, the 
POM is equally useful for jurisdictions with very modest amounts to spend on emergency 
preparedness and response, such as small- or mid-sized cities, or for national-level 
governments or agencies with emergency management budgets in the many millions or 
billions of dollars, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  The POM is also 
robust in its accommodation of different types of commodities staging locations (relief 
locations, RLs, expressed in the POM as lx) and arrival locations (AAs in the POM, 
expressed ax).  RLs can be land terminals such as a motor freight hub, air terminals such 
as the UPS Worldport air cargo operation at Louisville (KY) International Airport, or 
seaports such as the Port of Long Beach near Los Angeles. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This section explains the methodology employed to test the POM against two 
hypothetical, but realistic, major incidents.  The two hypothetical incidents simulate one 
natural disaster and one terrorist attack, respectively, both occurring in the National 
Capital Region.  Both are discussed in greater depth in Section C infra.  The first part of  
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this section describes the data used in the test cases, and their derivation.  The second 
subsection lists the most significant assumptions made, as well as limitations on the 
model’s use and the results obtained. 
1. Data Used 
The data used in the two test cases were obtained through a combination of 
publicly available information and interviews with logistics specialists, airport officials 
and other subject matter experts.  Where direct data were not available, attempts have 
been made to derive reasonable approximations based on best available information. 
The POM uses 15 different files to store the data needed for the model.  These 
may be generally described as follows: 
• Five data table files on AAs, RLs, TMs, potential survivors (PS), and 
commodity requirements 
• Five data definition files, defining the set of AAs, RLs, TMs, scenarios 
(ωx) for each test case, and the miscellaneous data parameters 
• A file for holding miscellaneous data, including budget, survivor penalty 
for undelivered commodities, and number of survivors attended per health 
care worker 
• Data on the number of workers per thousand cubic feet of commodities 
required under each scenario 
• A file to specify feasible RL departure points for all TMs 
• A table of enroute times for TMs from RLs to AAs 
• For each AA, a list of TMs that require ramp space 
The data are organized into five major sets:  transportation means, demand for 
each commodity type (workers and survivors), affected areas, relief locations, and other 
data, such as budget and penalty for undelivered commodities. 
a. Transportation Means 
The POM was originally tested with three TMs – the CH-53 helicopter, 
the MV-22 VSTOL aircraft, and the HMMWV (colloquially, the “Humvee”) military 






broader sampling of military airlift aircraft, as well as the most commonly used 
commercial cargo aircraft, and some ubiquitous forms of ground transportation, such as 
passenger buses and tractor-trailers.   
Appendix A summarizes the TM data used in this thesis.  Data on CH-53 
and MV-22 availability are assumed, consistent with Captain Tean’s research.  For C-130 
and C-17 military cargo aircraft, it is assumed that one full squadron of each are 
available, with another half-squadron in reserve.  The commercial cargo aircraft represent 
the most common aircraft in the United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express 
(FedEx) fleet.98  For the commercial cargo aircraft (B747, DC-10, A300, and MD-11), it 
is assumed that 20% of the UPS and FedEx fleets are available.  The Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet (CRAF) minimum of 15% of a carrier’s fleet is used as a benchmark.  This 
percentage relates almost exclusively to international flights, since the primary CRAF 
mission is military airlift to deployed locations overseas.99  To reflect the somewhat 
easier circumstance of mobilization in support of domestic disaster relief, the 15% figure 
is adjusted upward slightly, to 20%.  The total of 56 tractor trailers, box vans and 
passenger buses assumes that FEMA has activated all 28 federal US&R task forces, as 
happened after Hurricane Katrina.  Each US&R team typically travels with two each 
tractor trailers, box vans and passenger buses.100  The maximum expansion for these 
ground TMs is estimated based on the availability of government and commercial sources 
in or near the National Capital Region, the site of the hypothetical incidents.   
Survivor capacity refers to the capability of the TM to carry survivors 
away from the disaster zone.  The numbers have been gathered from publicly available 
data on the passenger capacity (if any) of each TM, taking into account the type of 
mission of each.  Thus, the general purpose CH-53 and MV-22 are assumed to be 
                                                 
98 “About FedEx: FedEx Express Facts,” Federal Express Corp., 
http://www.fedex.com/us/about/today/companies/express/facts.html?link=4 (accessed February 2007); 
“Federal Express Airfleets: Fleet Listing,” Airfleets.net, 
http://www.airfleets.net/flottecie/Federal%Express.htm (accessed February 2007). 
99 “Civil Reserve Air Fleet,” Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_Reserve_Air_Fleet (accessed February 2007). 
100 Kenneth Wright (Logistics Manager, TX-TF1 Urban Search & Rescue Team), telephone 




carrying workers and commodities, not survivors.  The same is true of all cargo aircraft 
and cargo vehicles.  The rescue CH-53 and MV-22 capacities are based on the maximum 
number of litter patients the aircraft can carry.  The passenger bus is able to evacuate a 
full load of ambulatory survivors, once it disgorges its US&R workers at the disaster site. 
Worker capacity refers to the number of relief workers that can be carried.  
Here, the data reflects the assumption that the general purpose CH53 and MV-22, the 
C-130J, and the C-17 are configured to carry nothing but passengers.  The same is 
assumed of the B747, the only cargo aircraft in the group routinely retrofitted to carry 
passengers.  The tractor trailer and the box van carry a small number of workers (three 
each) in the main cab.  The passenger van can carry a full complement of workers to the 
affected area. 
The POM is self-limited to examining the 72-hour period immediately 
after a disaster strikes.  Therefore, the three-day hours available represents the maximum 
number of hours in the observed period that a TM will be available for use.  Note that this 
does not indicate projected flight time for aircraft in the period, or travel time for ground 
TMs.  Instead, it acts as an outer boundary on the model’s use of the TM.  The figures for 
aircraft operating range have been obtained from publicly available sources.  Where an 
operating range is not available, as for the B747, it is calculated by dividing the 
maximum effective range of the aircraft with a full cargo load by the cruise speed.  The 
hours available for ground TMs are premised on the standard US&R practice of at least 
two drivers per vehicle, with minimum stops enroute.  Operating range for ground 
vehicles is based on a single tank of gas.101     
The POM uses variable expansion cost (vec) to determine whether a 
portion of the budget should be spent on more TMs.  Calculating the vec proved 
challenging.  Replacement cost is often an unrealistic measure.  For commercial cargo 
aircraft, for example, the federal government is not going to purchase another B747 for 
FedEx or UPS at a cost of $200 million.  Rather, the standard practice in the industry is to 
enter into ACMI (aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance) contracts with carriers.  
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Under an ACMI lease, the carrier provides all of the basics required to fly the airplane – 
the crew, routine maintenance, insurance, and the aircraft itself.  In a typical ACMI lease 
the contracting party, in this case the federal government, pays for fuel, landing fees, 
customs fees, and the like.   
This thesis assumes a 100-hour (minimum) ACMI lease for all aircraft 
variable expansion cost calculations.  Table 1 contains the results of the variable 
expansion cost calculations, using both replacement cost (RC) and block hours (BH) as 
separate bases for the calculations. 
Aircraft Replacement Cost ($) 
Block Hour Rate  
($/b.h.) 
Cargo Capacity 
(ft3 x 1000) 
Variable Expansion 
Cost (vec)($) (RC) 
Variable Expansion 
Cost (vec)($) (BH) 
C-130J102 48,000,000 3,200 4.551 10,657,000 70,314 
C-17103 202,300,000 15,280 8.736 23,157,000 174,908 
B747104 200,000,000 15,761 6.190 32,310,000 254,620 
DC-10105 88,400,000 12,800 4.618 19,142,000 277,176 
A300106 90,000,000 8,227 13.822 6,511,000 19,896 
MD-11107 101,660,000 14,000 21.100 4,815,000 66,350 
Table 1. Aircraft Expansion Costs Calculations – Replacement Cost vs. ACMI 
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The table illustrates the difference between a vec calculated using 
replacement cost (RC) and one calculated using an ACMI lease.  In the latter case, the 
block hour rate – that is, the cost per flight hour for the aircraft under the lease – is 
multiplied by 100 (assuming the entire 100-hour minimum is flown) and divided by the 
cargo capacity to obtain a more accurate measure of vec. 
b. Commodity Demand 
Commodity requirements following an incident will vary depending on 
several factors, including the nature of the incident, its scope and its projected duration.  
The following commodities list is derived from examination of a range of past disasters.  
It is recognized that this is not a comprehensive list; however, it includes most of the 
major requirements common to virtually all large-scale incidents: 
• Water 
• Food (MREs) 
• Shelter 






• Baby supplies 
• Clothing 
• Building supplies (plywood, nails, tools, etc.) 
• Fuel oil 
• Equipment (loaders, forklifts, medical equipment, etc.) 
• Other commodities (batteries, lights, communications equipment, etc.) 
Expected commodities requirements for the hypothetical scenarios are 
calculated for a 72-hour window forward from the initial time the incident has occurred.  


















Water (drinking) 1 gallon 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.000 
Water (non-
potable) 1 gallon 1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 3.000 
Meals (MREs) 3 meals 1 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5 4.500 
Portable shelter 1 shelter 4 6.0 2.0 1.5 4.5 4.500 
Basic medical kit 1 kit 3 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.3 0.333 
Cot 1 cot 2 3.0 2.0 1.0 3.0 3.000 
Blanket 1 blanket 1 2.0 2.0 0.5 2.0 2.000 
Tarp 1 tarp 3 3.0 3.0 1.0 3.0 3.000 
Ice 1 gallon 10 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.300 
Baby supplies 1 box 5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.600 
Generator 1 generator 500 8.0 8.0 6.0 0.8 0.768 
Clothing 1 bag 1 2.0 2.0 1.0 4.0 4.000 
Plywood 2 sheets 3 4.0 8.0 0.1 1.3 4.000 
Nails  1 box 3 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.3 1.000 
Table 2. Commodities Calculations Summary 
 
Different commodities will be required for the hurricane and WMD cases.  
Survivors of a nuclear detonation can be expected to need water, food, shelter, medical 
supplies, baby supplies, cots and blankets.  They should not need generators, as the city’s 
electrical grid should be able to withstand the explosive effects of the blast.  Likewise, 
since the destructive effects of a one-kiloton blast on structures would be limited to a 
fairly small area, building supplies would not be in great demand.  By contrast, hurricane 
survivors will need nearly all of the listed commodities.  Hurricane scenario 1 (ω1) 
assumes massive flooding in large parts of D.C.  Therefore, there are many more 
displaced survivors, and the commodities requirements include clothing.  Hurricane 
scenario 2 (ω2) assumes no flooding, therefore the number of displaced persons is 
significantly less, and clothing is not included in the commodities calculation. 
Summing the commodities requirements calculated from Table 2 results in 






ω1 - water, food, shelter, medical, cot, blanket, baby supplies 20.93 ft3 
ω2 - water, food, shelter, medical, cot, blanket, baby supplies 20.93 ft3 
 
WMD CASE 
ω1 - water, food, shelter, medical, cot, blanket, tarp, baby supplies, 
generator, clothing, plywood, nails 33.70 ft3 
ω2 - water, food, shelter, medical, cot, blanket, tarp, baby supplies, 
generator, plywood, nails 29.70 ft3 
Table 3.  Per Survivor Commodities Requirements, by Case and Scenario 
c. Affected Areas 
The POM defines affected areas (AAs) as “areas hit by the disaster.”108  
The model also uses data about each affected area, such as the commodities required, the 
available ramp space, and the area’s accessibility by the various TMs.  In this context, 
“ramp space” encompasses more than just aircraft parking and taxi areas at airports.  The 
term includes any large flat, open area suitable for parking and offloading vehicles, 
helicopters and VSTOL aircraft. 
For the two notional test cases in Washington, D.C., four AAs are 
selected.  Table 4 summarizes the AAs. 
 
Affected Area Name Domains supported 
a1 RFK Stadium parking lot Land 
a2 Reagan National Airport Air, Land 
a3 Washington-Dulles IAP Air, Land 
a4 National Mall Land 
Table 4. Affected Areas (AAs) 
The four areas represent a mix of domains, locations, and ramp capacity.  
For simplicity’s sake, the maritime domain is not modeled.  The map at Figure 5 depicts 
AA locations. 
                                                 





Figure 5. Washington, D.C. Showing Affected Areas109 
 
By locating the AAs at different points throughout the city, relief workers 
are better able to distribute commodities to displaced survivors.  In a true disaster, many 
more distribution points would be utilized.  However, four larger AAs are sufficient to 
demonstrate the general validity of the POM for a realistic scenario. 
Ramp space for each of the AAs is calculated differently, due to the 
different type and fidelity of data available for each location.  Ramp space at RFK 
Stadium is estimated from the published capacity of the parking lot for 10,000 cars and 
                                                 




300 buses.110  It is assumed that the space between parking spaces, such as access lanes, 
added an additional 30% to the total square footage.  It is estimated that the parking lot 
could be expanded by 50% over its current size.   
Of the total acreage reserved to Reagan National Airport (a2), 760 acres 
are above water.111  It is assumed that 40% of that land is ramp space.  Of that, it is 
further assumed that only 40% would be usable for commodity staging in a disaster, 
because of competing uses and inefficiencies.  Because of its location, surrounded on all 
sides by the Potomac River and developed commercial property, Reagan National has 
very little land within which to build additional ramp space.  Accordingly, the model 
assumes a maximum expansion of 20% over the current usable space.   
By contrast, Washington-Dulles International Airport (a3) is located on a 
broad, flat plain roughly 25 miles northwest of the city.  Its present size is 11,830 acres, 
of which 5,000 acres is reserved for aircraft operations.112  As with Reagan National, it is 
assumed that 40% of that 5,000 acres, or 2,000 acres, comprises ramp space.  Likewise, it 
is also assumed that 40% of that 2,000 acres would be usable for commodity staging.  
Unlike Reagan National, Washington-Dulles has much more undeveloped land around it.  
Therefore, it is assumed that the airport could expand its ramp space by an additional 
70% of the total acreage currently dedicated to aircraft operations, or 3,500 acres.    
The National Mall (including West Potomac Park and Constitution 
Gardens) is one of the largest areas of contiguous open land in the District of Columbia.  
It is also centrally located to several major government buildings and commercial areas.  
It runs in an east-west orientation from the Capitol Building to the east to the Lincoln 
Memorial at its western edge, with the Washington Monument dividing the area slightly 
west of center.  From the Grant Statue, just west of the Capitol, to the Lincoln Memorial 
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is 309 acres.113  Not all of this area is available to land and air traffic, owing to trees, 
monuments, and other areas such as the Lincoln Memorial Reflecting Pool.  Discounting 
for unusable areas, it is estimated that 70% of the 309 acres would be available for “ramp 
space.”  The area surrounding the National Mall is heavily developed.  Therefore, the 
model assumes that no expansion space is available. 
Initially, ramp space is calculated in two dimensions, using the methods 
and estimates discussed supra.  Because the POM’s standard unit of measurement is the 
cubic foot, it is necessary to convert the calculated area numbers to volume figures.  This 
is done by assuming that the entire usable area (again, accounting for transit corridors and 
turnabout areas) could be filled with LD3 container units, unstacked.  The LD3 is a Unit 
Load Device, or ULD, of the sort used in the cargo industry.  Its dimensions are 70” 
wide, 60.4” deep and 64” high.  It can be employed in all of the aircraft used in the 
model.114  It is used as the prototypical cargo container for this reason, and because of its 
ubiquitous nature in the air cargo industry.  Accordingly, each ramp space linear 
dimension is converted to a volume figure by multiplying it by 5.33 feet, the height of a 
standard LD3 container. 
The cost of ramp space expansion is derived from information graciously 
provided by Mr. Bob Beesley of the Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority.  
Memphis International Airport just added a new cargo ramp at a cost of about $14 per 
square foot.  That work, on a basically prepared site, included modest fine grading, ramp 
lighting and spill control measures.115  For Dulles and Reagan airports, ramp expansion is 
assumed to cost an equivalent $14/sq. ft.  For the RFK Stadium parking lot, the cost is 
discounted by 20%, to $11.20/sq. ft., because of the absence of ramp lighting and spill 
control measures. 
 
                                                 
113 “National Mall,” Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Mall 
(accessed February 2007). 
114 “Unit Load Device,” Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_Load_Device 
(accessed 10 February 2007). 
115 Robert Beesley (Director of Development, Memphis-Shelby County Airport Authority), e-mail 










(ft3 x 1000) 
Max 
Expansion 
(ft3 x 1000) 
Expansion 
Cost ($/ft3  
x 1000) 
a1 RFK Stadium parking lot 3,346 1,673 11,200 
a2 Reagan National Airport 28,250 14,125 14,000 
a3 Washington-Dulles IAP 185,656 813,120 14,000 
a4 National Mall 43,096     0 11,200 
Table 5. Affected Area Data Summary 
 
For all scenarios in both test cases, this information remains unchanged. 
d. Relief Locations 
Relief locations (RLs) in the POM are hubs to receive commodities and 
workers and process them for further deployment to the disaster site.  As Captain Tean’s 
thesis indicates, RLs represent places where relief units and assets are located, usually 
away from the AAs.116  Within DOD, these sites are often referred to as RSOI 
(Reception, Staging, Onward movement, and Integration) locations, or JRSOI locations if 
operating in a joint environment.  Borrowing the military’s formal description of the 
process, a JRSOI location may be defined as “[locations] required to transition arriving 
personnel, equipment, and materiel into [relief packages] capable of meeting operational 
requirements.”117 






l1 Memphis TN Int’l Airport Air, Land FedEx national air/land hub 
l2 Louisville KY Int’l Airport Air, Land UPS national air/land hub 
l3 Indianapolis IN Int’l Airport Air, Land U.S. Postal Service national 
airborne freight hub 
l4 Philadelphia PA Int’l Airport Air, Land UPS regional air/land hub 
Table 6. Relief Locations (RLs) 
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These four locations represent the largest air and land commercial cargo 
facilities in the same general region as Washington, D.C.  The Federal Express cargo 
facility at Memphis International Airport is the world’s largest and busiest domestic 
freight facility, in terms of total cargo processed annually.  Louisville is third, after Los 
Angeles International Airport.  Indianapolis is seventh, and Philadelphia thirteenth.118  
However, when one considers strictly domestic cargo carried, many of the airports ranked 
higher than Indianapolis and Philadelphia in total “landed weight” – Los Angeles, Miami, 
New York Kennedy, and Chicago O’Hare, for example – lag both cities.  In addition, all 
four airports have large ground freight processing facilities.  For example, the FedEx 
“Superhub” at Memphis International Airport routinely processes a half-million packages 
an hour, while the UPS Worldport is capable of sorting 304,000 packages per hour.119  
Analogous to the AAs, the POM uses commodity capacity, maximum 
expansion capacity and variable expansion cost in its relief location calculations.  Unlike 
the affected areas, however, RL capacities are for warehouse space alone, not ramp 
space.  In this regard, the model will tend to undershoot the actual space available for 
uploading, offloading and transferring cargo, but any error is to the conservative side.  
Additionally, this thesis assumes that only 20% of current warehouse capacity would be 
available for disaster relief.  This is slightly more than the CRAF required minimum of 
15%, and represents a reasonable upper limit on the amount of business the commercial 
cargo companies could divert to support disaster relief efforts on short notice.   
Like the AAs, data on RL warehouse space is inconsistent, requiring 
discrete calculations for each.  The UPS Worldport cargo facility at Louisville 
International Airport contains 4,000,000 square feet.  To obtain the present commodity 
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capacity, square footage is converted to cubic feet by assuming the equivalent of three 
LD3 container units could be stacked within the interior of the warehouse, to a height of 
16 feet.  Maximum expansion is set at 1,100,000 square feet or 17.6 million cubic feet, 
based on UPS’ current expansion plans for the facility.120   
For Memphis International, warehouse space is first estimated from the 
annual cargo throughput figures.  Memphis moves twice the annual cargo of Louisville 
International, therefore it is assumed to have twice the warehouse space.  This is 
confirmed by approximating the FedEx Superhub’s warehouse volume to be 60% of its 
total acreage, e.g. 294 acres.  Memphis International Airport is not constrained by 
geographic features or dense urban growth.  In fact, the airport recently expanded its 
ramp space by over 650,000 square feet.121  Accordingly, a moderate expansion factor of 
30% is assumed.   
The UPS warehouse at Indianapolis International Airport is 2,000,000 
square feet in size.122  Again assuming the warehouse could be stacked three deep with 
LD3 containers, this converted to 32 million cubic feet of initial capacity, of which 20%, 
or 9.6 million cubic feet, is assumed to be available for disaster relief. 
Finally, Philadelphia’s warehouse space is estimated by noting that its 
annual landed cargo weight is approximately 30% that of Louisville.  With little data 
available, it is somewhat arbitrarily assumed that Philadelphia could expand its 
warehouse capacity by 30%. 
The POM uses variable expansion cost to determine whether some of the 
allocated budget amount should be spent to expand warehouse capacity.  Since this 
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budget represents federal funds, it is unrealistic to expect that the federal government 
would pay the entire cost for expanding a commercial cargo facility.  Therefore, the 
calculated costs for constructing additional warehouse space were reduced by 50%.  This 
represents a notional arrangement in which the federal government agrees to pay 50% of 
the cost of expansion, in exchange for which the cargo company agrees to reserve the 
expanded space for government operations, including disaster relief.   
The cost for expanding Worldport is assumed to be the same as the cost of 
initial construction, or $300 per square foot.  Using the notional arrangement construct, 
that amount is reduced by 50%, to a final figure of $150 per square foot.  This amount is 
used for variable expansion cost for Louisville, Memphis and Philadelphia.  The UPS 
facility at Indianapolis International Airport has published plans to expand its warehouse 
capacity by 600,000.  The $214 million estimated construction cost equates to $357 per 
cubic foot, or $178.50 per cubic foot when reduced by 50%. 
The POM assumes that health care personnel will be picked up at RLs and 
transported to AAs to work in those affected areas.  Therefore, for each RL the model 
also utilizes information on initial capacity, maximum expansion, and variable expansion 
cost for health care personnel.  In the absence of better data sources, this thesis 
incorporated the data used by Captain Tean in his earlier research.123 







(ft3 x 1000) 
Max 
Expansion 
(ft3 x 1000) 
Expansion 
Cost ($/ft3  
x 1000) 
l1 Memphis TN IAP 24,589 36,883 150,000 
l2 Louisville KY IAP 12,800 17,600 150,000 
l3 Indianapolis IN IAP 6,400 9,600 178,500 
l4 Philadelphia PA IAP 3,840 5,760 150,000 
Table 7. Relief Location Data Summary 
 
                                                 




e.. Other Data 
The POM uses three other data elements:  budget, survivor penalty, and 
number of survivors per health care worker.  As will be discussed infra, the budget is 
varied in increments to observe its effect on the model’s outputs.  The other two 
parameters, survivor penalty and number of survivors per health care worker, remain 
constant across test cases and scenarios.  The former represents a penalty function of ten 
survivors per thousand cubic feet of undelivered commodities.  It is introduced in the 
POM to reflect an increase in the number of deaths if the survivors’ commodity 
requirements are not met.124  The latter is set in the original research at five survivors per 
health care worker.  That number has been carried over to this thesis without change. 
The POM also requires transit times for all TMs from RLs to AAs.  Air 
mileage from each RL to each AA is obtained through an Internet-based air mileage 
calculator.125  Driving mileage for ground vehicles is obtained from Mapquest.126  
Enroute time is then calculated for all possible routes.  The results are summarized in 
Appendix B. 
2. Assumptions and Limitations 
While every effort was made to use bona fide data from reliable sources, 
inevitably compromises had to be made.  Several assumptions were made in calculating 
data used in the model.  Some of these are discussed in Captain Tean’s thesis.127  Others 
are discussed in subsection 1 above.  Some additional assumptions include: 
• Security in the affected areas is sufficient to permit TMs to transit in and 
out safely and without impedance 
• All displaced persons need commodities, in equal amounts 
• Commodity requirements are aggregated for the duration of the 72-hour 
period of inquiry 
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• All commodities delivered to AAs are distributed to displaced persons 
• Displaced persons do not move from one AA to another 
• All survivors have equal evacuation priority 
• Each health care worker is able to care for five survivors, regardless of 
profession (nurse, doctor, pharmacist, etc.) 
• Special mission aircraft (CH-53S, MV-22S) are only configured for 
medical evacuation 
• General mission aircraft can deliver only commodities or relief workers 
• All TMs are immediately available for use 
• Any required maintenance or refueling on TMs is performed in the hours 
the TM is not available (see Appendix A) 
• All available and usable cargo space in the TMs is used on each trip 
• There are enough drivers and aircrew members for all TMs at all times 
during TM hours of availability 
• TMs proceed by the most direct route to and from AAs and RLs 
• Weather patterns (winds, precipitation, temperature, cloud cover, water 
levels) remain constant throughout the 72-hour period 
The model also has several limitations, some structural, and others the result of 
the assumptions articulated above.  These limitations include the following: 
• The probabilities assigned to the two scenarios bound the possible POM 
solutions.  It is left to further research to determine whether altering the 
probabilities significantly changes the model results. 
• The model can only indirectly account for changes in weather, by altering 
enroute times or rendering a particular route infeasible. 
• Self-help by persons within the affected areas is not modeled. 
• The contributions of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community 
groups, and ad hoc aid groups are not considered. 
• The generic category of “workers” is not further categorized, for instance 
by skills, profession, or mission assignment. 
• Requirements for support equipment, such as forklifts, pallets, portable 
toilets, and communications equipment, are not included. 
• Legal restrictions are ignored, for instance professional licensure and 
accreditation requirements for health care workers, zoning restrictions, and 





• Social effects are not modeled.  These include inaccurate media reporting, 
large non-native English speaking populations, and criminal activity.  All 
of these may dramatically alter factors such as the accessibility of AAs, 
survivor requirements, and the number of survivors needing rescue. 
• Certain effects are beyond the POM’s current capabilities to model.  
Examples include degraded communications, ambiguous or contradictory 
command and control, or multiple, parallel logistics processes. 
3. Testing the Hypothesis 
Admittedly, the POM paints with a fairly broad brush.  The purpose of this thesis, 
and of the POM itself, is not to model with precision the optimum logistics response to 
given test cases and scenarios.  Rather, the objective is to assess the validity of the POM 
as a strategic decision-making tool.  It is hypothesized that the outputs of the POM, 
generated under different sets of conditions, will provide strategic guidance to senior 
policymakers.  In turn, the strategic choices made with reference to the model’s results 
will reduce the resource gap between the exhaustion of state and local capabilities and the 
arrival of sufficient federal resources to meet commodity requirements.  Two notional 
cases are used to test the hypothesis. 
C. TEST CASES 
The two test cases developed to evaluate the validity of the POM share 
Washington, D.C. as the common situs.  The cases represent the spectrum of advanced 
notice:  a sudden terrorist attack with no warning, and a hurricane that has moved up the 
East Coast over a period of days before striking the nation’s capital.  In the terrorist 
attack case, the model examines the response to a one-kiloton (1 kT) nuclear detonation 
near Union Station in downtown Washington, D.C.  In the latter case, disaster relief 
efforts commence after a Category IV hurricane has passed directly over the city.  In 
addition to simulating different preparation periods, the test cases also exemplify 
real-world threats facing the National Capital Region.   
Both test cases are further subdivided into two scenarios.  The first scenario, 
denominated ω1 for each test case, assumes a “worse case” condition, while the second 
scenario (ω2) describes a “better case.”  To account for the relative likelihood of each 




scenario (ω2) occurring is fixed at 0.75.  The assignment of probabilities to the two 
scenarios narrows the model’s focus and imposes boundaries on possible solutions.  
While for simplicity’s sake this thesis examines only two scenarios per test case, the 
POM can be run with multiple scenarios simultaneously, each with a discrete probability 
assigned.  This aspect of the model is particularly valuable when assessing data trends, 
and evaluating the sensitivity of the outputs to changes in scenario inputs. 
1. One-Kiloton Nuclear Detonation 
The first notional case is a small nuclear device exploding above ground near 
Union Station.  The two scenarios are identical except for the wind direction.  In Scenario 
1 (ω1), at the time of the explosion winds are from the northeast at 15 knots.  Scenario 2 
(ω2) assumes winds from the west, also at 15 knots.  The different wind directions force 
the POM to adjust for the unavailability of different commodity drop-off locations.  In 
Scenario 1, the National Mall is unavailable because of the potential for fallout.  For the 
same reason, RFK Stadium’s parking lot is unavailable in Scenario 2. 
The map in Figure 6 was generated by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency 
(DTRA).  It displays the projected plume of a 1 kT explosion near Union Station, given 
prevailing wind patterns from the southwest.   Wind arrows for Scenario 1 (northeast 
winds at 15 kts) and Scenario 2 (west winds at 15 kts) are superimposed to permit 






Figure 6. Plume Analysis of 1 kT Explosion at Union Station128 
 
By far the greatest impact of the nuclear detonation would be fallout.  As depicted 
in Figure 7, damage to structures from the blast effects would be limited to an area of less 
than a quarter-mile radius from the epicenter of the blast.  Therefore, most casualties will 
come from radiation exposure. 
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Figure 7. Union Station WMD -- Structural Damage from Air Blast Overpressure129 
 
It is assumed that the detonation takes place on a work day, during working hours.  
In the first scenario, the fallout is blown toward the densely populated area of multi-story 
government and commercial buildings west and south of Union Station.  Therefore, total 
persons in need of medical care (“Potential Survivors” in the POM) number 25,000 for 
Scenario 1, higher than the 15,000 person estimate for Scenario 2.  The distribution of 
potential survivors is effected according to the wind pattern.  For the northeast winds of 
Scenario 1, a greater proportion of survivors are evacuated to RFK Stadium, away from 
the plume direction.  For the west winds of Scenario 2, the greatest numbers of survivors 
congregate at the National Mall, also away from the plume.  The two airports, Reagan 
National (a2) and Dulles (a3), receive fewer people in need of medical care, in part 
because of their distance from the incident site. 
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Total commodity requirements are estimated by multiplying the number of 
displaced persons by the amount of commodities needed per person, from Tables 2 and 3 
supra.  In turn, requirements are allocated to affected areas in proportion to the number of 
survivors at each AA. 
The potential survivors and commodity requirements for the WMD test case are 
summarized in Table 8. 
 
Potential Survivors Commodity Requirements (ft3 x 1000) Affected Area 
NE Winds (ω1) W Winds (ω2) NE Winds (ω1) W Winds (ω2)
a1 15,000 0 753 0 
a2 2,500 3,500 126 195 
a3 7,500 2,500 377 140 
a4 0 9,000 0 502 
Table 8. WMD Detonation – Potential Survivors and Commodity Requirements 
 
2. Category 4 Hurricane 
The hypothetical case of a Category IV hurricane striking a major metropolitan 
area corresponds to Planning Scenario 10 (Natural Disaster – Major Hurricane) of the 
fifteen National Planning Scenarios.130  Although Planning Scenario 10 assumes a 
Category V hurricane, the casualty and flooding estimates are comparable between 
Planning Scenario 10 and the test case used here.  In addition, it is likely that a hurricane 
making landfall southeast of Washington, D.C. would lose some of its strength before 
reaching the city, as depicted in the DTRA wind forecast model shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Category IV Hurricane -- Wind Speed Model131 
 
Compared to the nuclear detonation case, a major hurricane would leave 
widespread damage in its wake.  Depending on the size of the storm surge, critical 
infrastructure such as power stations, bridges, roads and airports could be adversely 
affected.  The two hurricane scenarios simulate these different degrees of impact.  
Scenario 1 (ω1) posits widespread flooding, in particular in the south and southeast parts 
of the city.  Figure 9 maps the areas likely to be impacted by light to moderate flooding. 
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Figure 9. Category IV Hurricane -- Storm Surge Forecast132 
 
Based on Figure 9, Scenario 1 assumes that Reagan National is inaccessible to 
other land and air TMs.  It further assumes that the bridge crossings to the city are 
degraded, resulting in increased travel times for land TMs.  Because the massive flooding 
will displace many more residents from their homes, the number of displaced persons in 
Scenario 1 is 180,000, vice 35,000 for Scenario 2.  Likewise, the flooding can be 
expected to increase the number of potential survivors.  The scenarios reflect this – total 
potential survivors for Scenario 1 is 25,000, while the total for Scenario 2 is 7,000.   
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Like the WMD test case, total commodity requirements are derived by 
multiplying the total number of displaced persons by the amount of commodities needed 
per person, from Tables 2 and 3 supra.  Requirements for each AA are then allocated in 
proportion to the number of survivors at each AA.   
Table 9 summarizes the data for the hurricane test case. 
 








a1 10,000 3,500 2,426 520 
a2 0 800 0 119 
a3 2,500 0 607 0 
a4 12,500 2,700 3,033 401 





























Notwithstanding the inherent limitations on the data and the model discussed in 
Chapter IV, the POM fulfills its promise as a strategic tool.  Its outputs illuminate trends 
and relationships that planners and policymakers can use to best allocate scarce public 
funds to enhance readiness and improve incident response.  In short, the hypothesis has 
been proved:  strategic decisions made by reference to the POM can reduce the resource 
gap between the exhaustion of state and local resources and the arrival of federal aid.   
In general terms the POM’s outputs are illuminating in a number of respects.  
Appendix C summarizes the potential survivors not saved, commodities not delivered, 
and amounts spent for the WMD test case and its two scenarios, through a range of 
budgets from a low of $8 million to a maximum of $200 million.  Appendix D 
summarizes the results for the hurricane test case. 
The first observation relates to the outputs for both “better case” scenarios, 
labeled ω2 for both test cases.  The outputs indicate that Washington, D.C. could 
adequately respond to a small (1 kT) nuclear detonation or a Category IV hurricane with 
no flooding with modest strategic expenditures, and without the necessity for large-scale 
contracted transportation support.  For all ω2, irrespective of budget, virtually all 
commodities are delivered, and all (or nearly all) potential survivors are evacuated.  Only 
rarely do actual expenditures even approach the budgeted amounts, and then only at 
lower budget levels – roughly $50 million for the hurricane case, and $25 million for the 
WMD case. 
Even for the more problematic scenarios (ω1 for both test cases), the combination 
of organic federal resources and readily available commercial transportation means 
typically results in a high percentage of potential survivors saved, and required 
commodities delivered.  However, these scenarios are characterized by higher 
expenditures relative to the budget.  For the WMD case, the model calls for essentially 






the budget does not decrease the number of survivors lost, which is already zero by that 
point.  Likewise, all commodities are delivered in virtually every WMD ω1 case, 
irrespective of budget.   
The ω1 mass flooding hurricane scenario causes more problems, primarily 
because of the loss of Reagan National Airport and the degradation of ground routes into 
and out of the city.  One consequence of the limitations is the persistence of a core 
number of unrescued survivors for a wide budget range, from $8 million through $50 
million.  Only at budget amounts above $50 million does the number of unrescued 
survivors eventually taper off, finally reaching zero at a $200 million budget level.  This 
is perhaps explained by the high cost of procuring more rescue helicopters to save the 
remaining survivors, in lieu of much cheaper ground transportation means that cannot be 
used because of flooding.  If flooding is indeed the cause of the increased numbers of 
unsaved survivors, one would expect a more linear relationship between expenditures and 
survivors saved for the WMD case, where access routes are open.  The POM bears this 



























Other conclusions, less obvious from the outputs, are significant in their own 
right.  None of the model outputs calls for ramp space expansion.  This holds true despite 
the data reflecting some conservative assumptions regarding ramp space.  For example, in 
calculating available ramp space at Reagan National and Dulles, only 40% of the total 
airport acreage is considered.  Of that, only 40% is deemed available for commodity 
staging operations, or  a combined 16% of total airport acreage.  Even with this 
restriction, the POM does not allocate any budget amounts to ramp expansion.  This may 
be attributed to the scale of the notional disasters.  The largest scenario, hurricane 
Scenario 1, assumes 180,000 displaced persons.  This is approximately one-third of the 
population of Washington, D.C., from a 2003 estimate.133  Ramp expansion might be 
called for if the scenario assumed that two-thirds of the population is displaced. 
On the other end of the supply chain, the POM suggests expansion of warehouse 
space at only one relief location (RL), Indianapolis International Airport, and then only 
during the hurricane mass flooding scenario.  Common sense supports this result.  In a 
real disaster response that includes the commercial carriers, the greatest share of air cargo 
traffic will pass through Memphis and Louisville, the FedEx and UPS hubs.  Both of 
those locations have outsized cargo processing facilities with millions of square feet 
inside.  As a concession to the economic realities of the commercial cargo business, the 
POM assumes that only 20% of the total warehouse capacity at the RLs will be dedicated 
to disaster relief.  Even with that significant reduction, the model does not allocate any 
funds to warehouse expansion at the RLs except under the most trying scenario, and then 
only at Indianapolis.  There is an object lesson here for government logistics planners and 
policymakers.  Pre-arranged partnerships with the commercial cargo industry will pay 
huge dividends when surge transportation is needed.  The major commercial freight 
companies have vast resources across the spectrum of transportation activities and 
domains, from distributed networks of warehouses to aircraft, step vans, tractor trailers, 
and even an armada of forklifts. 
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When considering transportation means, the POM expresses a clear preference for 
tractor-trailers.  This is not surprising:  they are much cheaper than air transports, carry 
large volumes of goods, and are ubiquitous.  With closed land routes in hurricane 
Scenario 1, the model prefers the military transport aircraft, specifically the C-17 and the 
CH-53.  Commercial cargo aircraft are used, but to a lesser extent.  This trend endures 
even when the variable expansion cost for commercial cargo aircraft is cut significantly 
through the use of ACMI leases.  The exception is the B747 outfitted to carry passengers.  
This is the POM’s preferred method for moving large numbers of workers to the affected 
areas.   
Arguably the finding with the most significance for strategic policymaking relates 
to unrescued survivors.  Even at low budget levels, the percentage of potential unrescued 
survivors remains relatively small, typically hovering around 15%.  While increasing the 
budget does reduce the number and percentage of unrescued survivors, the per-person 
rescue costs rise dramatically as the absolute number of unrescued survivors declines.  
This variation on the law of diminishing returns is graphically illustrated in Figure 11, 
which plots the change in ratio of rescued survivors to budget (i.e., dollars per rescued 


























Figure 11.  Expended Dollars Per Rescued Survivor 
 
Of course, the overarching policy issue is where to set the threshold?  Is there a 
putative ceiling on the per-person rescue cost, given the realities of federal funding 
streams that are limited in both time and amount?  The question cannot be answered 
without reference to moral, ethical, legal and political considerations.  Still, POM outputs 
provide policymakers with a baseline for evaluation, and a degree of situational 




























VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
At the outset, it was shown that humanitarian logistics is a critical, but 
oft-slighted, element of an effective disaster relief process.  Examination of the relief 
efforts following Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, the Asian tsunami, and other major 
disasters revealed that a resource gap (“gap of pain”) frequently develops between the 
time when state and local resources are exhausted, and sufficient federal replacements 
arrive.  Reducing this gap necessitates the effective balancing of four alternative 
approaches to managing the supply chain:  pre-positioning, proactive deployment, surge 
transportation, and phased deployment.  The optimal blend of approaches requires 
strategic assessment of conditions such as warehouse space, ramp space, available 
transportation means, and demand for commodities, workers and health care personnel.  
This paper hypothesized that the Pre-positioning Optimization Model (POM) could 
provide planners and decision makers with strategic information on the optimal 
placement and mix of relief assets.  In turn, it has been proposed that such information 
could be used to reduce the gap of pain by improving the flow of workers and 
commodities into and out of a disaster area. 
To test the hypothesis, data were gathered to support two hypothetical incidents 
occurring in the Washington, D.C. area:  a terrorist detonation of a one-kiloton nuclear 
weapon near Union Station, and a Category IV hurricane passing over the city.  Efforts 
have been made to employ accurate data as much as possible.  However, the ultimate 
objective was to assess the general validity of the model as a strategic tool, not to produce 
a precise planning document for the two test cases.   
Using the POM, stochastic solutions have been obtained for the two test cases, for 
a range of fixed budgets from a low of $8 million to a maximum of $200 million.  The 
results validate the model’s usefulness as a source of strategic guidance.  In smaller-scale 
incidents, such as the less serious scenarios in both test cases, it appears that regional, 
state and local response capabilities, in partnership with federal agencies such as DOD 
and FEMA, would be adequate to meet requirements, without the need for major support 




resources and assets from the private sector would be required to adequately respond to 
larger incidents, such as a major hurricane with subsequent flooding.  The extensive 
infrastructure and capabilities resident in commercial cargo carriers such as FedEx and 
UPS are simply not replicable in the public sector. 
The POM uses mathematical optimization techniques to maximize the expected 
number of rescued survivors, subject to a penalty for unmet commodity demands.  Using 
notional data, the model results show that there is a diminishing rate of return in terms of 
rescued survivors as the budget is increased.  At higher budget levels, the incremental 
cost per survivor rescued is considerably greater than the cost per survivor at moderate 
and low budget levels.  The results also show that certain conditions will create pockets 
of unsaveable survivors.  In the hurricane test case, widespread flooding has this effect.  
The shutdown of Reagan National and degradation of access routes into the city results in 
delays in delivering needed commodities, rescue workers, and health care personnel to 
hard-hit areas.  As a consequence, some victims die before they can be supplied or 
triaged on-site, or evacuated to unaffected areas.  This phenomenon creates difficult 
policy choices for government officials.  Small budget increases are unlikely to have 
much effect, and the larger amounts necessary to buy, for example, more rescue 
helicopters may not be viable for reasons of politics, fiscal constraints, or legal 
prohibitions. 
The broader point is that money is not a panacea.  Officials in Aceh, Indonesia 
had difficulty delivering to tsunami survivors the vast amounts of food, medicine and 
potable water that arrived en masse on the cargo aircraft of the world’s richest countries.  
The regional capital, Banda Aceh, has only one airstrip.  Until several days after the 
tsunami hit, it had only one functioning forklift truck.134  No amount of money could 
solve that problem on Day 2 of the relief effort.  Instead, a long-term strategy that 
emphasized requirements and capacities was in order.  A functional strategy would 
answer two seminal questions:  what items and how much of each will survivors need, 
and what manpower and equipment will be needed to deliver it? 
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This is precisely the purview of the POM.  By giving planners and policymakers a 
template for forecasting commodity and worker needs as well as facility and equipment 
requirements, the POM alters the fundamental humanitarian relief question from “How 
much can we send?” to the more useful “What, and how much, do they need?”   
At this stage of its development, the POM is a useful, though rudimentary, 
analytical tool.  The model could be improved in a number of ways to make it more 
user-friendly, more accurate, and more useful.  Some of these suggested improvements 
are enumerated in Captain Tean’s thesis.  The more salient include: 
• Improving the fidelity of the input data. 
• Adding the ability to test alternative objective functions. 
• Extending the period of observation beyond the 72-hour window 
immediately following the incident. 
• Adding a graphical user interface for easier data input and more intuitive 
output displays. 
• Refining and expanding parameter categories.  Captain Tean suggests 
adding a class of survivors who need to be evacuated, but do not need 
medical attention.135  Other refinements might include further subdividing 
workers into specialties, such as US&R team members or communications 
experts, and adding a separate category for truck drivers and aircrew 
members. 
Apart from improving the model itself, the next step in POM development should 
incorporate some additional processes.  These include: 
• Operational validation of the model by logistics planners, using real-world 
data and a variety of test cases, scenarios and probabilities 
• Integration of the POM with other analytical tools, such as FEMA’s 
HAZUS-MH loss estimation software, to build a complete operational 
picture of particular test cases through the entire disaster life cycle 
• Establishment of user groups and communities of practice to share 
improvements to the model and best practices for its employment 
• Development of partnerships with commercial air and land freight carriers, 
and distribution of the model to these partners 
 
                                                 




• Use of POM results to inform the development of requirements for state 
and federal contracts with private air and land freight carriers, to provide 
equipment, transportation and materiel support for disaster relief efforts 
• Procurement of federal funding, perhaps through the Department of 
Homeland Security, for continued research on technological solutions to 
improving humanitarian supply chain management processes 
A final observation:  the POM is at its most powerful when it is used to detect 
trends and relationships.  There is some marginal utility in knowing that, for example, the 
model chooses tractor-trailer trucks to deliver all commodities after a WMD attack, given 
a $40 million budget.  There is exponentially more value in knowing that the POM makes 
the same choice at all budget levels, if land routes are accessible.  Accordingly, to 
achieve its full potential, the POM needs to be stretched; that is, run multiple times with 
different conditions, alternately varying different parameters and tinkering with the 
assumptions.  For example, the model might be run assuming different levels of resource 
commitments from commercial cargo carriers.  Or, it might be instructive to compare the 
model’s results in the Washington, D.C. hurricane scenario as different combinations of 
road and bridge closings are simulated.   
It is hoped this thesis will inspire some within the logistics and the operations 
research communities to take this model and improve upon it, or develop a better one.  
Ultimately, no matter the elegance or utility of the POM or any other model, it is only a 
tool.  However, used judiciously, it can prompt the sort of strategic changes that will 




APPENDIX A.  TRANSPORTATION MEANS DATA SUMMARY 
































25 20 0.858 0 24 60 10 
C-130J138 
Cargo 
aircraft 24 36 4.551 0 92 60 5 
C-17139 
Cargo 
aircraft 24 36 8.736 0 102 60 5.33 
B747140 
Cargo 
aircraft 5 4 6.190 0 366 60 14.23 
DC-10141 
Cargo 
aircraft 12 8 4.618 0 0 60 6.14 
A300142 
Cargo 
aircraft 16 11 13.822 0 0 60 5.47 
MD-11143 
Cargo 




vehicle 56 300 5.256 0 3 63 16.5 
Box Van145 
Cargo 




vehicle 56 250 0 56 56 63 12 
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  a1 a2 a3 a4 
CH-53S.l1 4.39 4.35 4.28 4.36 
CH-53S.l2 2.77 2.73 2.60 2.75 
CH-53S.l3 2.91 2.87 2.74 2.89 
CH-53S.l4 0.65 0.69 0.78 0.68 
l1 = Memphis IAP  
l2 = Louisville IAP 
l3 = Indianapolis IAP 
l4 = Philadelphia IAP     
CH-53G.l1 4.39 4.35 4.28 4.36 
CH-53G.l2 2.77 2.73 2.60 2.75 
CH-53G.l3 2.91 2.87 2.74 2.89 
CH-53G.l4 0.65 0.69 0.78 0.68 
     
MV-22S.l1 2.75 2.73 2.68 2.74 
MV-22S.l2 1.74 1.71 1.63 1.72 
MV-22S.l3 1.83 1.80 1.72 1.81 
MV-22S.l4 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.42 
     
MV-22G.l1 2.75 2.73 2.68 2.74 
MV-22G.l2 1.74 1.71 1.63 1.72 
MV-22G.l3 1.83 1.80 1.72 1.81 
MV-22G.l4 0.41 0.43 0.49 0.42 
     
C-130J.l1  2.19 2.16  
C-130J.l2  1.52 1.46  
C-130J.l3  1.58 1.52  
C-130J.l4  0.67 0.71  
     
C-17.l1  1.84 1.82  
C-17.l2  1.30 1.26  
C-17.l3  1.35 1.31  
C-17.l4  0.62 0.65  
     
B747.l1  1.75 1.73  
B747.l2  1.24 1.20  
B747.l3  1.29 1.25  














  a1 a2 a3 a4 
DC-10.l1  1.61 1.59  
DC-10.l2  1.16 1.12  
DC-10.l3  1.20 1.16  
DC-10.l4  0.59 0.61  
     
A300.l1  1.74 1.72  
A300.l2  1.24 1.20  
A300.l3  1.29 1.24  
A300.l4  0.61 0.64  
     
MD-11.l1  1.68 1.65  
MD-11.l2  1.20 1.16  
MD-11.l3  1.24 1.20  
MD-11.l4  0.60 0.62  
     
Tractor trailer.l1 14.70 14.65 14.40 14.65 
Tractor trailer.l2 10.27 10.17 10.00 10.17 
Tractor trailer.l3 10.15 10.05 9.87 10.05 
Tractor trailer.l4 2.13 2.25 2.53 2.20 
     
Box Van.l1 22.70 22.65 22.40 22.65 
Box Van.l2 18.27 18.17 10.00 18.17 
Box Van.l3 18.15 18.05 9.87 18.05 
Box Van.l4 2.13 2.25 2.53 2.20 
     
Passenger bus.l1 22.70 22.65 22.40 22.65 
Passenger bus.l2 10.27 10.17 10.00 10.17 
Passenger bus.l3 10.15 10.05 9.87 10.05 
Passenger bus.l4 2.13 2.25 2.53 2.20 
NOTES: 
* Aircraft flight time calculations are increased 25 minutes for takeoff and 
landing (distance shortened 15 miles); helicopter and VTOL aircraft enroute 
times are not adjusted 
* For land transportation methods, 8 hour rest period is added where enroute 
time exceeds max operating range in hours (see Appendix A) 
* Blank cell indicates infeasible route (excessive distance or mismatched 



































8 3372 13.49% 0 0.00% 0 0.00 7,500,000 7,500,000 
10 3108 12.43% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 9,895,358 10,000,000 
12 3053 12.21% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 12,000,000 6,904,642 
15 2592 10.37% 56 0.37% 0.38 0.00 14,050,000 14,050,000 
20 2232 8.93% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 20,000,000 17,504,642 
25 1628 6.51% 88 0.59% 4.24 4.61 24,894,000 24,894,000 
30 1368 5.47% 0 0.00% 0.2 0.00 29,981,000 22,181,000 
35 880 3.52% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 35,000,000 22,035,946 
40 348 1.39% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 40,000,000 21,835,946 
45 204 0.82% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 45,000,000 10,638,796 
50 191 0.76% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 50,000,000 10,239,836 
55 136 0.54% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 55,000,000 10,039,836 
60 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 60,000,000 9,839,836 
65 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 60,486,676 10,326,512 
70 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 60,486,676 10,326,512 
80 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 68,849,108 10,326,512 
90 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 68,849,108 10,326,512 
100 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 68,849,108 10,326,512 
150 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.07 68,849,108 16,623,200 





























































8 3924 15.70% 0 0.00% 945.46 0.00 8,000,000 5,902,400 
10 3924 15.70% 20 0.29% 885.60 0.29 10,000,000 8,516,672 
12 3924 15.70% 0 0.00% 821.10 0.00 12,000,000 11,102,976 
15 3895 15.58% 24 0.34% 743.12 0.00 15,000,000 14,032,680 
20 3860 15.44% 0 0.00% 651.84 0.00 20,000,000 15,230,742 
25 3852 15.41% 0 0.00% 546.98 0.00 25,000,000 23,889,600 
30 3924 15.70% 0 0.00% 443.48 0.00 30,000,000 30,000,000 
35 3937 15.75% 0 0.00% 344.39 0.00 35,000,000 34,493,504 
40 3957 15.83% 0 0.00% 252.79 0.00 40,000,000 39,689,280 
45 3948 15.79% 0 0.00% 154.45 0.00 45,000,000 42,875,456 
50 3861 15.44% 0 0.00% 103.31 0.00 50,000,000 49,073,830 
55 3612 14.45% 0 0.00% 24.51 0.00 55,000,000 53,643,088 
60 3209 12.84% 0 0.00% 29.27 2.12 60,000,000 19,793,856 
65 2864 11.46% 0 0.00% 1.54 0.06 65,000,000 19,820,008 
70 2468 9.87% 0 0.00% 27.16 0.00 70,000,000 15,316,486 
80 1356 5.42% 0 0.00% 1.66 11.90 80,000,000 54,391,552 
90 428 1.71% 0 0.00% 23.53 0.00 90,000,000 54,718,720 
100 36 0.14% 0 0.00% 1.65 0.00 100,000,000 100,000,000 
150 16 0.06% 0 0.00% 0.00 0.00 150,000,000 17,238,254 
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